Summary
Renovate may follow a NuGet registry's pagination URL without confirming that it belongs to the configured registry origin. A malicious or compromised registry could therefore cause Renovate to send registry credentials to an additional attacker-controlled host when requesting the next page.
Affected context
The issue occurs when Renovate retrieves package versions from a NuGet registry and processes pagination links supplied through the HTTP Link header. It becomes risky when the registry can return a cross-origin pagination target and Renovate attaches the configured registry credentials to that follow-up request. Exploitation depends on the registry being malicious or compromised.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: NuGet package-version discovery and pagination handling
- Required access: Control of, or compromise of, the configured NuGet registry response
- Trigger point: Processing a pagination URL from the HTTP
Linkheader - Required condition: Renovate must have registry credentials configured for the affected NuGet source
- Why exploitation is possible: Pagination targets are followed without enforcing same-origin restrictions, while registry credentials are included in the subsequent request
Why this happens
The underlying bug is insufficient validation of an externally supplied redirect or pagination URL. Renovate trusted the registry-provided Link target without comparing its origin with the configured registry, then reused credentials when making the follow-up request. This maps to CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site, because attacker-influenced navigation can redirect authenticated requests to an unintended host.
Potential impact
- Registry credentials may be disclosed to an additional attacker-controlled server
- An attacker could use exposed credentials to access private packages or registry operations
- Dependency metadata or package retrieval workflows could be manipulated if the credentials permit write access
- Credential exposure could support broader supply-chain compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating pagination and redirect targets as untrusted input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting pagination requests to the same origin as the configured registry
- Comparing scheme, hostname, port, and relevant origin components before following links
- Avoiding credential forwarding across origins by default
- Applying least privilege and narrowly scoped permissions to registry credentials
- Separating read-only package discovery credentials from publishing or administrative credentials
- Allowing cross-origin behavior only through an explicit, tightly controlled security policy
These controls reduce credential exposure even when a registry response is malicious or compromised.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules that identify credential-bearing requests following untrusted URLs
- Code review checks for redirect and pagination handling
- Tests asserting that cross-origin
Linktargets are rejected or stripped of credentials - Dependency and registry policies that restrict outbound requests to approved origins
- Network monitoring for authenticated requests from Renovate to unexpected hosts
Automated security review tools may help identify URL validation and credential-forwarding patterns during development.

