Summary
Renovate may follow a pagination URL supplied in a GitHub HTTP Link header without verifying that it belongs to the GitHub host originally contacted. A malicious or compromised repository host or GitHub datasource can therefore redirect requests to an attacker-controlled server and disclose credentials configured for that host.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs when Renovate communicates with GitHub.com, GitHub Enterprise Cloud, or GitHub Enterprise Server and processes server-supplied pagination links. It becomes risky when the contacted GitHub endpoint is malicious or compromised and can return a Link header whose next URL points to a different, attacker-controlled host. The affected interaction may involve a repository host or datasources such as GitHub releases, tags, or Git references.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP pagination handling for GitHub API requests
- Required access: Control or compromise of the GitHub server or datasource endpoint Renovate contacts
- Trigger point: Renovate follows a server-provided
Linkheader containing anextpagination URL - Why exploitation is possible: The destination host is not sufficiently validated before credentials configured for the original host are sent
Why this happens
The underlying bug is insufficient validation of a server-controlled redirect or pagination URL. Renovate trusted the next URL in the HTTP Link header without enforcing that its scheme, host, and relevant origin matched the endpoint that supplied the response. This behavior maps to CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site, because attacker-influenced navigation can cause sensitive request credentials to cross a trust boundary.
Potential impact
- Authentication credentials may be disclosed to an attacker-controlled host
- API tokens or other host-specific secrets could be used for unauthorized access
- Private repository or organization data may be exposed
- An attacker could use captured credentials to alter repositories, dependencies, or automation workflows
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating pagination and redirect destinations as untrusted input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting pagination URLs to the expected scheme, authority, and approved host
- Reusing credentials only for the originally configured host
- Disabling credential forwarding across origin or host changes
- Applying explicit allowlists for trusted API endpoints and datasource hosts
- Treating compatibility options that bypass host validation as tightly controlled exceptions
- Using narrowly scoped, least-privilege tokens with limited repository and API permissions
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar risks through:
- Static analysis for HTTP clients that follow server-supplied URLs while forwarding authentication
- Code review checks for
Linkheader parsing, redirect handling, and credential propagation - Tests that return cross-host pagination or redirect targets and verify that credentials are not sent
- Runtime logging and policy enforcement for outbound requests from Renovate to unapproved hosts
- Dependency and security scanning rules focused on unvalidated URL construction and origin changes

