Summary
AVideo exposes sensitive details for password-protected live transmissions, including the RTMP stream key and HLS playlist URL, through an unauthenticated statistics path. Its shipped streaming configuration may also serve the playlist, encryption key, and media segments without enforcing the configured password, allowing remote viewers to access protected broadcasts.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in AVideo deployments using the Live plugin and the affected statistics and HLS delivery paths. Risk is higher when unauthenticated callers can query transmission metadata and the NGINX /live location serves playlists, AES-128 keys, or transport-stream segments without an active authorization check. The exact exposure depends on deployment routing, access controls, and whether the shipped streaming configuration remains unchanged.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public Live plugin statistics endpoints and the HLS origin
- Required access: No authentication may be required when the affected endpoints and media paths are internet-accessible
- Trigger point: Requesting live transmission metadata or HLS resources associated with a password-protected broadcast
- Why exploitation is possible: The password state is disclosed without enforcing it, while the media origin may serve the playlist, encryption key, and segments without an effective authorization check
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an access-control failure that exposes protected resource metadata and fails to consistently enforce authorization across related delivery paths. The statistics function returns stream identifiers and HLS locations even when a transmission is password-protected, including through a fallback branch, while the NGINX configuration does not require authorization for all sensitive HLS resources. This maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because credentials, stream locations, and decryption material become available to unauthenticated callers.
Potential impact
- An unauthenticated party may watch a password-protected live transmission
- An attacker could obtain an RTMP stream key and interfere with or impersonate a broadcast
- Exposure of the HLS encryption key could enable unauthorized media retrieval
- Protected broadcast content may be copied, redistributed, or monitored
- Stream integrity and availability could be affected if exposed credentials are reusable
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing one consistent authorization policy for metadata, playlists, keys, and media segments.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require authentication and authorization before returning stream keys, protection status, or HLS URLs
- Apply the same access-control decision to every HLS resource, including playlists, encryption keys, and segments
- Enable an effective authorization subrequest or equivalent policy at the media origin
- Avoid exposing sensitive stream identifiers to unauthenticated clients
- Use short-lived, scoped stream credentials and rotate exposed keys
- Separate public discovery metadata from protected transmission details
- Run origin and proxy components with least privilege and restrict direct access to internal media paths
- Test denial behavior for both normal and fallback application-listing branches
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and configuration checks for disabled or commented authorization directives on media locations
- Code review searches for endpoint branches that return secrets or protected resource URLs without an authorization decision
- Integration tests that request statistics, playlists, encryption keys, and segments without credentials and verify consistent denial
- API inventory and policy enforcement for endpoints disclosing stream keys, tokens, or internal origin URLs
- Proxy and application logs showing unauthenticated access to protected live resources
- Automated security review tools that flag missing authentication middleware and publicly reachable sensitive files

