Summary
WWBN AVideo contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in LoginControl plugin endpoints that update a user's PGP two-factor authentication public key without validating a CSRF token.
If a logged-in victim visits an attacker-controlled page, the request may replace the stored key, potentially locking the user out or enabling account takeover when the attacker also knows the password.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in AVideo deployments using the LoginControl plugin and its PGP key management endpoints. Risk is present when those state-changing endpoints accept browser-authenticated requests without requiring a valid, session-bound CSRF token or an equivalent origin validation control.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Browser-accessible LoginControl PGP key management endpoints
- Required access: The victim must be authenticated to the AVideo application; the attacker may only need to host or deliver a malicious web page
- Trigger point: A cross-origin request to the endpoint that saves or replaces the public key
- Why exploitation is possible: The application accepts ambient session credentials for a sensitive state-changing action without verifying that the request originated from the legitimate application
Why this happens
The underlying bug is missing request-origin validation on a state-changing endpoint. A browser automatically includes relevant authentication context with requests, and the application does not require a cryptographically unpredictable CSRF token or comparable protection before changing the PGP 2FA public key.
This maps to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery, in which an application processes an attacker-induced request using the privileges of an authenticated victim.
Potential impact
- An attacker may replace a victim's registered PGP 2FA public key.
- A victim could be locked out of the account if the new key is unavailable to them.
- An attacker could enable account takeover when they also know or obtain the victim's password.
- Administrative or user security settings could be changed without the victim's intentional action.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on protecting every state-changing, browser-authenticated endpoint with a server-validated anti-CSRF control.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring a unique, unpredictable CSRF token tied to the user session and validating it server-side.
- Enforcing appropriate SameSite cookie settings and using origin or referer checks as defense-in-depth.
- Applying CSRF protections consistently to API-like endpoints that rely on browser session authentication.
- Requiring explicit reauthentication or step-up verification before changing MFA or PGP security credentials.
- Reducing trust in ambient browser credentials and separating sensitive operations from ordinary session actions.
- Returning safe responses for invalid, missing, or cross-origin requests without performing the requested state change.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:
- Static analysis searches for state-changing handlers that lack CSRF middleware or token validation.
- Code review checks for credential, MFA, or key-management endpoints accepting browser requests without origin controls.
- Dynamic testing that submits cross-origin requests while an authenticated session is present and verifies that no state change occurs.
- Policy enforcement requiring CSRF protection for non-idempotent routes, especially those modifying authentication settings.
- Automated security testing and neutral code-review tools that flag missing request-origin validation.

