Summary
WWBN AVideo contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the LoginControl plugin because User-Agent values are stored in login history without adequate output encoding.
An attacker with a valid account may place script content in a User-Agent value, which could execute in an administrator's browser when the Login History page is viewed.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in AVideo deployments using the LoginControl plugin and its login-history functionality. It becomes risky when attacker-controlled User-Agent headers are recorded and later rendered in an administrator-facing page without context-appropriate encoding. Exploitation depends on an administrator viewing the affected login-history data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The LoginControl plugin's login-history recording and display features
- Required access: Any valid account capable of submitting requests to the AVideo application
- Trigger point: An administrator or other privileged user viewing the Login History page
- Why exploitation is possible: User-Agent data is attacker-controlled, persisted, and rendered without sufficient output encoding
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure to treat HTTP header values as untrusted data throughout their storage and rendering lifecycle. The LoginControl plugin stores the User-Agent header and later incorporates it into an administrator-facing page without applying context-appropriate HTML output encoding. This behavior maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, commonly known as cross-site scripting.
Potential impact
- Malicious script execution in an administrator's browser
- Exposure or misuse of administrator session context
- Unauthorized actions performed through the administrator's privileges
- Modification of application content or settings
- Potential access to sensitive information available to the administrator
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on preserving untrusted-data boundaries and applying output encoding at the point where data is rendered.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying context-specific HTML escaping to User-Agent values and other login metadata
- Treating all request headers as untrusted, even when they are stored for operational purposes
- Using templating systems with auto-escaping enabled by default
- Validating and constraining logged values without relying on validation as a replacement for output encoding
- Restricting administrative privileges and protecting administrator sessions with appropriate browser and application controls
- Reviewing existing stored records when changing rendering behavior, since previously persisted values may remain unsafe
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis rules that flag unescaped values in HTML templates or response construction
- Code review checks tracing request headers from collection through persistence and rendering
- Dynamic testing that verifies special characters in logged metadata are rendered as text rather than markup
- Security policies requiring auto-escaping or approved encoding functions for administrator-facing pages
- Automated application-security testing and neutral code-review tools that detect reflected or stored data-flow paths

