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CVE-2026-88863

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Improper Privilege Management (CWE-269) in Capgo Invite API

CVE-2026-88863

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Privilege Management

CWE:

CWE-269

Impact:

Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Capgo's invitation workflow does not sufficiently compare an inviter's role with the role requested for a new organization member. An authenticated user with permission to invite users may therefore grant elevated organization roles, potentially providing administrative control over apps, channels, members, and billing when the invitation is accepted.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Capgo deployments where the private invitation endpoint authorizes elevated invitations without enforcing the inviter's role rank. The risk is present when a user with a lower-level invitation permission can submit a request for an administrative role and the acceptance workflow uses service-level database privileges to create the resulting role binding.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated organization invitation API - Required access: An account with permission to invite organization users,

such as an org_member holding org.invite_user

  • Trigger point: Creating an invitation for an elevated role and having the

invitee accept it

  • Why exploitation is possible: The invitation validation path does not

compare the caller's role rank with the requested role, while the

acceptance workflow uses a service-role key that can bypass database

privilege-escalation safeguards

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization decision that checks whether the caller may invite users but does not verify whether the caller is permitted to assign the specific requested role. This is an instance of CWE-269, Improper Privilege Management: authorization logic permits a lower-privileged principal to cause creation of a higher-privileged role binding. Reliance on service-level database credentials further weakens compensating database controls when application-layer authorization is incomplete.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may escalate from a member-level role to an administrative role.
  • An attacker could gain control over organization apps and channels.
  • An attacker could add, remove, or alter organization members.
  • An attacker may access or modify billing-related organization functions.
  • An attacker could use administrative access for broader data or operational abuse.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on enforcing role hierarchy checks at every privilege-granting boundary. Invitation services should compare the authenticated caller's effective rank with the requested role and deny requests that exceed it, while applying the same policy during invitation acceptance and role-binding creation. Authorization should be evaluated using the requesting user's identity rather than relying solely on service-level credentials. Secure-by-default role assignment, centralized policy enforcement, immutable audit records, and least-privilege service accounts can reduce exposure. Database constraints and triggers should remain defense-in-depth controls rather than the only authorization mechanism.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis and code review searches for invitation or membership-creation paths that validate capabilities without comparing requested and caller role ranks. Reviewers can inspect uses of service-role credentials, direct role-binding writes, and authorization checks performed only before invitation creation or only after acceptance. Policy tests should verify that every role can be granted only by an equal-or-higher-ranked principal, including through alternate API flows. Runtime monitoring can alert on lower-privileged users creating elevated invitations or unusual administrative role changes. Automated security review tools may help flag missing authorization checks and privilege-boundary crossings.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Cap-go/capgo.app/security/advisories/GHSA-7g7p-fxx8-4wm8
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/capgo-app-through-12.207.1-privilege-escalation-via-invite-new-user-to-org

Frequently asked

questions

An authenticated organization user may be able to exploit it if the account

has invitation permission but lacks the role rank required to grant the

requested elevated role.

Yes. The elevated role binding is created during the invitation acceptance

workflow, so the invitation must be accepted for the escalation to take

effect.

Enforce a server-side role-hierarchy comparison before creating invitations

and again before creating the membership binding, using the caller's

authenticated authorization context.

Centralize authorization policy, test every role-assignment path including

acceptance flows, minimize service-account privileges, and monitor for

unexpected elevated role grants.

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