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CVE-2026-87996

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

DNS Rebinding (CWE-367) in Open WebUI URL Loader Component

CVE-2026-87996

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

DNS Rebinding

CWE:

CWE-367, CWE-918

Impact:

Server-Side Request Forgery and Internal Service Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Open WebUI contains a DNS rebinding vulnerability in its SafePlaywrightURLLoader, where a hostname is validated once and resolved again by the browser under potentially different DNS results. An authenticated user who controls authoritative DNS may cause web search or URL ingestion to access internal services or cloud metadata.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Open WebUI deployments that use the affected URL-loading and browser-based retrieval paths. It becomes risky when an authenticated user can submit a hostname for web search or URL ingestion and influence authoritative DNS responses between application-level validation and Playwright's subsequent connection. Environments with reachable internal services or cloud metadata endpoints may have greater exposure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web search or URL ingestion functionality using SafePlaywrightURLLoader
  • Required access: An authenticated account capable of submitting or controlling a target URL
  • Additional condition: Ability to control authoritative DNS responses for the target hostname
  • Trigger point: The hostname is validated by Python and later resolved again by the Playwright request interceptor
  • Why exploitation is possible: The validation and browser connection may use different DNS results, allowing a public address to pass validation while a later resolution targets an internal address

Why this happens

The vulnerability is a time-of-check/time-of-use condition involving DNS resolution. The application checks a user-controlled hostname in one execution context, but the browser independently resolves that hostname again when making the request. Because DNS answers can change between these operations, the validated destination is not necessarily the destination that receives the request. This maps primarily to CWE-367: Time-of-Check Time-of-Use Race Condition, with behavior also associated with CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.

Potential impact

  • Internal service responses may be exposed to an authenticated attacker
  • Cloud instance metadata or temporary credentials could be accessed
  • Requests may reach administrative interfaces that were not intended to be public
  • Internal network topology and service information could be disclosed
  • Follow-on compromise may be possible if exposed services accept sensitive operations

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making destination validation and connection enforcement use the same trusted resolution and networking controls.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Resolve and validate destinations through a controlled resolver, then enforce the approved IP at connection time
  • Prevent browser redirects or subsequent resolutions from bypassing destination policy
  • Apply explicit allowlists for permitted external hosts and schemes
  • Block private, loopback, link-local, reserved, and cloud metadata address ranges at the egress layer
  • Isolate retrieval workers from sensitive internal networks and metadata endpoints
  • Run retrieval components with least-privilege network permissions
  • Avoid relying solely on hostname validation performed before a separate browser request

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review searches for hostname validation followed by independent browser or HTTP resolution
  • Review of URL-fetching code for DNS rebinding, redirect, and IP-range validation weaknesses
  • Tests using controlled DNS responses that change between validation and connection
  • Egress policies and network telemetry that flag retrieval workers connecting to private, link-local, loopback, or metadata addresses
  • Monitoring for unusual requests from web retrieval components to internal service ports
  • Automated security review tools that identify potential SSRF and time-of-check/time-of-use patterns

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/27402ff210bfa253445720920dfb86b15a00327b
github.comgithub.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/28634
github.comgithub.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.11.1
github.comgithub.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-4v28-j6q3-5m4r

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through Open WebUI's web search or URL ingestion features when those features are exposed to authenticated users. Exploitation also requires control over authoritative DNS for the submitted hostname.

The attacker generally needs an authenticated account with permission to submit URLs or initiate retrieval operations, plus control of DNS responses for the target domain.

Ensure that the destination validated by policy is the same destination used for the actual browser connection. Combine this with strict egress filtering and blocking of private and metadata address ranges.

Treat user-controlled URLs as untrusted, account for DNS changes and redirects, isolate fetchers from sensitive networks, and continuously test URL-loading paths against SSRF and DNS-rebinding scenarios.

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