Summary
Wyoming contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in its HTTP API that allows unauthenticated network attackers to influence outbound connections through a malicious uri query parameter.
When affected endpoints accept attacker-controlled tcp:// or unix:// URIs, the server may connect to arbitrary attacker-selected targets instead of the configured backend.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Wyoming deployments that expose the affected HTTP API endpoints and allow the uri query parameter to override the configured backend. Risk is higher when the service can reach internal networks, local Unix sockets, cloud metadata services, or other privileged network destinations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP API endpoints including
/api/info,/api/speech-to-text, and/api/text-to-speech - Required access: Network access to the affected API; authentication is not required according to the vulnerability description
- Trigger point: Processing a request containing a malicious
uriquery parameter - Why exploitation is possible: The server accepts attacker-controlled
tcp://orunix://destinations and uses them to establish outbound connections, overriding the configured backend
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is insufficient validation and authorization of a user-controlled URI used for backend selection. Instead of treating the configured backend as trusted application state, the HTTP API allows request data to influence connection destinations without adequately restricting schemes, hosts, ports, or local socket paths.
This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-supplied input causes the server to make network or local inter-process connections on the attacker's behalf.
Potential impact
- An attacker may probe internal services that are not directly exposed
- The server could connect to cloud metadata or administrative endpoints
- Sensitive responses may be disclosed through API behavior or timing
- The attacker could reach privileged services accessible from the Wyoming host
- Local Unix sockets could be abused to interact with unintended processes
- Internal network reconnaissance and follow-on attacks could become easier
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing attacker control over connection destinations and enforcing an explicit outbound trust policy.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Ignore or reject client-supplied backend URI overrides unless they are explicitly required
- Permit only approved schemes, hosts, ports, and Unix socket paths through an allowlist
- Resolve and validate destinations before connecting, including protections against DNS and address-based bypasses
- Block access to loopback, link-local, private, and metadata-service ranges when they are not required
- Apply network egress controls and isolate the service from sensitive internal segments
- Run the service with minimal filesystem, socket, and network privileges
- Return generic errors that do not disclose internal connection details
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis and code review for request parameters passed into socket, HTTP, or Unix-socket connection APIs
- Searches for URI parsing without scheme, host, port, address-range, or socket-path allowlists
- API gateway policies that reject unexpected URI schemes and backend override parameters
- Network monitoring for unusual outbound connections from the Wyoming process or container
- Alerts for requests containing
tcp://,unix://, loopback, private-range, link-local, or metadata-service destinations - Automated security testing that verifies backend selection cannot be redirected through user-controlled input

