/

CVE-2026-86754

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Broken Access Control (CWE-863) in Snipe-IT OAuth Routes

CVE-2026-86754

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized Administrative API Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Snipe-IT improperly restricts Laravel Passport OAuth client-management routes, allowing any authenticated user to register clients with attacker-controlled redirect URIs. By persuading an administrator to approve a consent request, an attacker may obtain a bearer token with administrative API permissions and an unusually long lifetime.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Snipe-IT deployments using Laravel Passport OAuth client-management functionality when route authorization does not adequately distinguish ordinary authenticated users from administrators. Risk increases when administrators can be induced to approve unfamiliar OAuth consent requests and issued tokens are permitted to remain valid for extended periods.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Laravel Passport OAuth client-management and authorization routes
  • Required access: An authenticated Snipe-IT account, plus a way to influence or register OAuth client data
  • Trigger point: Registration of a client with an attacker-controlled redirect URI followed by administrator approval of the authorization request
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not sufficiently restrict client registration, allowing a lower-privileged user to create a client that can receive authorization codes and exchange them for tokens inheriting administrative permissions

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authorization failure in which authenticated status is treated as sufficient permission to access sensitive OAuth client-management functionality. This maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, because the application does not enforce the intended privilege boundary before allowing users to create clients and control redirect destinations. The resulting trust in attacker-controlled OAuth metadata can redirect authorization responses and enable unintended privilege acquisition.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain bearer tokens with administrative API permissions
  • Unauthorized users could access, modify, or delete protected Snipe-IT data
  • Long-lived tokens could extend the period of unauthorized access
  • Attackers could alter asset, user, or configuration records
  • Compromised API access could support persistence or further administrative abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing least privilege across OAuth management and authorization workflows.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting OAuth client registration and management to explicitly authorized administrators
  • Applying server-side authorization checks consistently to every sensitive route and action
  • Validating redirect URIs against controlled, pre-registered values rather than accepting arbitrary destinations
  • Using narrowly scoped, short-lived access and refresh tokens where operationally possible
  • Requiring clear consent context and additional verification for requests involving elevated permissions
  • Reviewing and revoking existing clients and tokens whose ownership or redirect destinations are uncertain
  • Limiting API permissions according to the requesting principal rather than broadly inheriting administrator privileges

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and route audits that compare OAuth endpoints with their required authorization policies
  • Code review checks for authenticated-only middleware on administrative client-management actions
  • Tests confirming that ordinary users cannot create or modify OAuth clients or redirect URIs
  • Monitoring for newly registered clients, unusual redirect destinations, administrator consent events, and token issuance
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved redirect-URI inventories and controlled OAuth scopes
  • Automated security review tools that identify authorization gaps and privilege escalation paths

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-gq7g-hxjg-8j27
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/snipe-it-before-8.7.0-authorization-bypass-via-oauth-clients

Frequently asked

questions

An authenticated user may be able to exploit the authorization gap, although obtaining an administrative token generally also depends on persuading an administrator to approve the attacker-controlled authorization request.

Not necessarily. The attacker needs an authenticated account and access to the affected OAuth workflow; administrator interaction may be required to approve elevated consent.

Enforce explicit, server-side authorization for OAuth client management, restrict redirect URIs to approved values, and minimize token scope and lifetime.

Treat OAuth client registration as a privileged administrative operation, test every route for role separation, monitor consent and token events, and regularly review active clients and credentials.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.