Summary
WWBN AVideo does not adequately verify ownership of the live_restreams_id supplied to its restreaming endpoint. An authenticated user with canStream permission may therefore direct their broadcast to another user's configured YouTube, Facebook, or Twitch destination when arbitrary identifiers are accepted.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in AVideo's live restreaming functionality, specifically where resendRestreamer.json.php processes a caller-supplied live_restreams_id. Deployments are at risk when authenticated users with canStream permission can submit identifiers without a server-side check confirming that the referenced restream destination belongs to them or is otherwise authorized for their account.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The live restreaming endpoint handling
live_restreams_id - Required access: An authenticated AVideo account with
canStreampermission - Trigger point: A restream request containing an identifier for a configured destination
- Why exploitation is possible: The server accepts the referenced identifier without reliably validating ownership or authorization
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an object-level authorization failure. The application uses a client-controlled resource identifier to select a restream destination but does not enforce an ownership or permission relationship between that destination and the requesting user.
This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, commonly associated with insecure direct object references. Authentication and the canStream capability establish access to the feature, but they do not by themselves authorize access to every restream configuration.
Potential impact
- An attacker may broadcast content to destinations configured by another user.
- Victims' YouTube, Facebook, or Twitch streams could be hijacked or disrupted.
- Private stream keys may be indirectly abused through unauthorized destination selection.
- Organizations could experience reputational, operational, or financial harm from unauthorized broadcasts.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the resource boundary rather than trusting submitted identifiers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Verify that each requested restream destination belongs to the authenticated user or is explicitly delegated to them.
- Resolve resource identifiers through server-side authorization-aware queries.
- Avoid treating possession of a feature-level permission as access to all associated objects.
- Use allowlisted destination records and opaque identifiers where appropriate, without treating opacity as authorization.
- Limit the privileges and scope of accounts permitted to configure or trigger restreaming.
- Rotate exposed stream credentials and review existing destination configurations when unauthorized use is suspected.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this issue through:
- Static analysis rules that flag direct object lookups based on request parameters without nearby ownership checks.
- Code review checks requiring authorization validation for every resource identifier received from clients.
- Dynamic tests that attempt to access one account's restream destination from another account with equivalent feature permissions.
- Audit logging for restream requests, destination identifiers, account ownership, and authorization decisions.
- Policy enforcement requiring object-level authorization tests for API endpoints that manipulate user-owned resources.
- Automated security review tools that identify insecure direct object reference and authorization-boundary patterns.

