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CVE-2026-86718

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CSRF (CWE-352) in WWBN AVideo History API

CVE-2026-86718

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-352

Impact:

Unauthorized state changes to live transmission history

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in history management endpoints that accept state-changing GET requests without validating a CSRF token. An attacker can use a malicious webpage to cause a logged-in administrator's browser to delete live transmission history or mark streams as finished.

Affected context

The issue occurs in AVideo deployments where the affected history endpoints are reachable by an authenticated administrator's browser and rely on browser credentials without requiring a request-specific CSRF token. Risk is higher when state-changing operations are exposed through GET requests and an administrator can be induced to visit attacker-controlled content.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Web-accessible history management endpoints
  • Required access: The attacker generally does not need an AVideo account, but the victim must have an authenticated administrator session
  • Trigger point: A victim administrator visits a malicious page or follows attacker-controlled content that causes the affected GET request to be sent
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application accepts a state-changing request without verifying a CSRF token or equivalent request-intent control

Why this happens

The vulnerability is caused by performing state-changing actions through browser-authenticated GET requests without validating an unpredictable, request-specific anti-CSRF value. Because browsers may automatically attach session credentials to cross-origin requests, an attacker-controlled site can cause a victim's browser to submit an unintended action. This behavior maps to CWE-352, Cross-Site Request Forgery.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may delete live transmission history
  • An attacker may mark active streams as finished
  • Administrators could lose operational or audit information
  • Application state could be manipulated without the administrator's deliberate intent
  • Repeated requests could disrupt monitoring and live-stream management workflows

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation commonly focuses on making state-changing operations resistant to

cross-origin request forgery.

  • Require anti-CSRF tokens or an equivalent server-validated request-intent mechanism for state-changing actions
  • Use POST, PUT, or DELETE semantics for mutations rather than GET
  • Validate request origin or referer signals as a supplementary control where appropriate
  • Configure session cookies with suitable SameSite protections and secure attributes
  • Apply authorization checks to every mutation and limit administrative privileges
  • Avoid relying on client-side confirmation dialogs as a security boundary

How teams detect issues like this

  • Use static analysis to identify state changes implemented by GET handlers
  • Review endpoint code for missing CSRF-token generation, validation, or failure handling
  • Search routing and controller logic for destructive actions that trust browser cookies without request-intent verification
  • Add dynamic tests that submit cross-origin requests while an administrative session is active
  • Enforce API design policies requiring non-GET methods and CSRF protection for browser-authenticated mutations
  • Automated code review tools can help flag missing CSRF middleware and unsafe state-changing routes

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-gmx5-mhqr-h7rj
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/wwbn-avideo-cross-site-request-forgery-via-deletehistory-json-php

Frequently asked

questions

The attacker typically does not need to authenticate to AVideo. However, exploitation depends on causing a logged-in administrator's browser to send the request with the administrator's session credentials.

No direct account access is generally required. The attacker needs a delivery mechanism, such as a malicious webpage, and a victim administrator who is authenticated to the affected application.

Require server-validated CSRF protection for every browser-authenticated state-changing operation and use non-GET HTTP methods for mutations.

Combine CSRF middleware or token validation with secure cookie settings, origin checks, least-privilege administration, and tests that verify cross-origin requests cannot change application state.

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