Summary
Bransys ELD contains hardcoded MQTT credentials that can provide access to an affected broker. An attacker who obtains or uses these credentials may read real-time data from active devices across connected carriers, depending on broker exposure and authorization controls.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Bransys ELD deployments that use embedded MQTT credentials to connect to a broker serving device telemetry. Risk is greatest where the credentials can be extracted from the application or redistributed, and where the broker permits broad read access across active devices or carrier environments.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: MQTT broker access used by Bransys ELD
- Required access: Ability to obtain, extract, or otherwise use the embedded credentials
- Trigger point: Authentication to the affected MQTT broker and subscription to permitted telemetry topics
- Why exploitation is possible: Shared static credentials may authenticate a requester without adequately isolating devices, carriers, or read permissions
Why this happens
The underlying issue is the inclusion of authentication secrets directly in software distributed to users or devices. Hardcoded credentials can be recovered, reused, and shared outside the intended trust boundary. This maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, particularly when one credential set provides access beyond a single device or narrowly scoped tenant.
Potential impact
- Attackers may read real-time telemetry from active devices
- Sensitive operational or location-related data could be disclosed
- Multiple devices or carrier environments may be exposed through shared authorization
- Stolen credentials could support persistent unauthorized broker access
- Data access could enable tracking, profiling, or follow-on attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared secrets from distributed application code and narrowing broker authorization.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using per-device or per-tenant credentials with scoped permissions
- Storing secrets in protected runtime-managed mechanisms rather than source code or packages
- Rotating exposed credentials and invalidating shared static credentials
- Applying MQTT topic-level read and write authorization
- Enforcing broker encryption and strong client authentication
- Separating carrier and device data through tenant-aware access controls
- Running clients with the minimum permissions required for their function
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:
- Static analysis and secret-scanning rules for embedded usernames, passwords, tokens, and broker configuration
- Review of application packages, firmware, binaries, and deployment artifacts for reusable credentials
- Code review checks for shared MQTT identities and wildcard topic permissions
- Broker audit-log analysis for unusual subscriptions, geographic access, or concurrent credential use
- Policy enforcement that blocks committed secrets and requires scoped, rotatable credentials
- Automated security review tools that flag hardcoded authentication material and overly broad messaging permissions

