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CVE-2026-86520

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Hardcoded Credentials (CWE-798) in Bransys ELD Platform

CVE-2026-86520

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hardcoded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Unauthorized access to real-time device data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Bransys ELD contains hardcoded MQTT credentials that can provide access to an affected broker. An attacker who obtains or uses these credentials may read real-time data from active devices across connected carriers, depending on broker exposure and authorization controls.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Bransys ELD deployments that use embedded MQTT credentials to connect to a broker serving device telemetry. Risk is greatest where the credentials can be extracted from the application or redistributed, and where the broker permits broad read access across active devices or carrier environments.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MQTT broker access used by Bransys ELD
  • Required access: Ability to obtain, extract, or otherwise use the embedded credentials
  • Trigger point: Authentication to the affected MQTT broker and subscription to permitted telemetry topics
  • Why exploitation is possible: Shared static credentials may authenticate a requester without adequately isolating devices, carriers, or read permissions

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the inclusion of authentication secrets directly in software distributed to users or devices. Hardcoded credentials can be recovered, reused, and shared outside the intended trust boundary. This maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, particularly when one credential set provides access beyond a single device or narrowly scoped tenant.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may read real-time telemetry from active devices
  • Sensitive operational or location-related data could be disclosed
  • Multiple devices or carrier environments may be exposed through shared authorization
  • Stolen credentials could support persistent unauthorized broker access
  • Data access could enable tracking, profiling, or follow-on attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared secrets from distributed application code and narrowing broker authorization.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using per-device or per-tenant credentials with scoped permissions
  • Storing secrets in protected runtime-managed mechanisms rather than source code or packages
  • Rotating exposed credentials and invalidating shared static credentials
  • Applying MQTT topic-level read and write authorization
  • Enforcing broker encryption and strong client authentication
  • Separating carrier and device data through tenant-aware access controls
  • Running clients with the minimum permissions required for their function

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:

  • Static analysis and secret-scanning rules for embedded usernames, passwords, tokens, and broker configuration
  • Review of application packages, firmware, binaries, and deployment artifacts for reusable credentials
  • Code review checks for shared MQTT identities and wildcard topic permissions
  • Broker audit-log analysis for unusual subscriptions, geographic access, or concurrent credential use
  • Policy enforcement that blocks committed secrets and requires scoped, rotatable credentials
  • Automated security review tools that flag hardcoded authentication material and overly broad messaging permissions

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-260-01.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-260-01

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable over the network if an attacker can obtain the embedded credentials and reach the affected MQTT broker.

Not necessarily. If the credentials are recoverable from distributed software or an application package, an attacker may use them from another system, subject to broker network and authorization controls.

Replace shared hardcoded credentials with individually scoped, rotatable identities and enforce least-privilege MQTT topic permissions.

Use secret scanning throughout development, keep credentials outside distributable code, isolate tenant data, rotate exposed secrets, and monitor broker authentication and subscription activity.

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