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CVE-2026-86419

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) in MISP Egress

CVE-2026-86419

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-918

Impact:

Internal Resource Access and Credential Disclosure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A critical server-side request forgery vulnerability in MISP's feed retrieval and TAXII discovery features permits unsafe outbound HTTP requests. Under certain configurations, attackers may redirect requests to internal resources or cause feed credentials and authentication headers to be forwarded to an unintended host.

Affected context

The issue affects MISP deployments using feed retrieval or TAXII discovery functionality in affected versions up to and including 2.5.45. Risk is present when the server processes attacker-influenced or externally controlled URLs, follows redirects, resolves hostnames, or reuses configured request headers without comprehensive destination and scheme validation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MISP server-side outbound HTTP requests used for feeds and TAXII discovery
  • Required access: Ability to influence a feed URL, discovery endpoint, redirect destination, or related externally controlled resource
  • Trigger point: Feed retrieval or TAXII discovery when MISP resolves a hostname, follows a redirect, or makes a subsequent outbound request
  • Why exploitation is possible: Incomplete validation may permit internal destinations, alternate IP representations, IPv6 loopback addresses, multiple DNS results, or cross-host redirects; reused headers may also expose configured credentials

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from incomplete server-side URL egress validation. Feed processing followed redirects without consistently validating the redirect scheme and destination, reused request headers across hosts, and could validate a hostname before a later DNS resolution changed the destination. TAXII discovery used narrow address comparisons that did not cover alternate IP encodings, IPv6 loopback, or all returned DNS records. This maps primarily to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, with CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information applying to possible credential forwarding and disclosure.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may cause MISP to access internal services that are not publicly reachable.
  • Internal metadata, administrative endpoints, or service responses could be exposed.
  • Configured feed credentials or authentication headers could be disclosed to an unintended external host.
  • Network access controls could be bypassed through alternate address representations or unsafe redirects.
  • The MISP server or connected internal services could be used as a pivot point for further attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on centralized, fail-closed outbound URL validation and strict separation of trust between configured destinations and redirect targets.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Route all feed and TAXII requests through a shared egress-validation component.
  • Permit only approved schemes and validate every redirect destination.
  • Block private, loopback, link-local, and other restricted destinations, including IPv6 and alternate numeric representations.
  • Validate all DNS results and pin the validated destination to prevent re-resolution after validation.
  • Remove configured credentials and sensitive headers before following a cross-host redirect.
  • Apply allowlists for trusted feed and TAXII hosts where operationally feasible.
  • Run outbound requests with least-privilege network access and restrict unnecessary internal connectivity.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying outbound HTTP clients that follow redirects without destination validation.
  • Code review checks for hostname-only filtering, incomplete IP comparisons, unsafe DNS resolution order, and header reuse across hosts.
  • Tests covering IPv4, IPv6, decimal and hexadecimal address forms, multiple DNS records, cross-host redirects, and DNS rebinding scenarios.
  • Network monitoring for MISP connections to private address ranges, loopback interfaces, cloud metadata services, or unexpected external hosts.
  • Policy enforcement requiring centralized URL egress validation and explicit outbound host allowlists.

Automated security review tools may help identify inconsistent SSRF defenses across separate URL-handling paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/MISP/MISP/commit/06f541dcf
github.comgithub.com/MISP/MISP/commit/08d6efe24

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how feed and TAXII URLs are configured and whether an attacker can influence a destination or redirect. Exploitability also depends on the MISP server's network reachability and outbound access.

The attacker generally needs a way to influence a server-side outbound URL, such as through a controllable feed or discovery target. Direct access to the internal network is not necessarily required.

Use one shared, fail-closed egress validator that checks schemes, destinations, all DNS results, redirect targets, and alternate address representations. Strip sensitive headers whenever a request crosses hosts.

Combine strict outbound network policy with centralized URL validation, comprehensive tests for address and redirect edge cases, least-privilege service networking, and monitoring for unexpected internal or cross-host requests.

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