Summary
A SQL injection vulnerability in the Tourism-Management-System allows attacker-controlled values in database-related parameters to influence SQL queries. When a remotely reachable endpoint accepts these values without safe query construction, an attacker may read, alter, or delete database content.
Affected context
The weakness occurs in the CommonDao functionality used by
travel/src/main/java/com/controller/CommonController.java. It may affect
deployments where remotely supplied table, column, xColumn, or
yColumn arguments reach database query construction without parameterization
or strict identifier validation. The precise exposure depends on routing,
authentication, and deployment-specific access controls.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable application endpoint invoking the affected controller or data-access path
- Required access: The ability to submit requests containing controllable database-related arguments; authentication requirements depend on the deployment
- Trigger point: Processing of the
table,column,xColumn, oryColumnparameters during query generation or execution - Why exploitation is possible: Untrusted input may be incorporated into SQL syntax or identifiers without sufficient parameterization, allowlisting, or context-aware validation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an injection flaw caused by mixing untrusted request
data with SQL statements or query identifiers. CWE-89 applies when input is
interpreted as SQL syntax rather than strictly as data. CWE-74 is the broader
injection category covering cases where external input changes the meaning
of an interpreter command. Table and column names generally cannot be handled
by ordinary value placeholders, so they require separate allowlist-based
validation and controlled query construction.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read sensitive records from the application database
- An attacker could modify or delete tourism, user, or operational data
- Database integrity and application availability may be affected
- Exposed database credentials or connected services could enable further compromise
- Audit trails and business workflows may be manipulated
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on separating data from SQL structure and
reducing the amount of request input trusted by the data-access layer.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all user-controlled values
- Validate table and column identifiers against narrowly defined server-side allowlists
- Avoid accepting arbitrary database identifiers from clients when fixed mappings can be used
- Keep query construction inside a constrained data-access abstraction
- Apply database accounts with only the privileges required by each operation
- Enforce authentication, authorization, and request validation before database access
- Return generic database errors and avoid exposing query details to clients
- Use defense-in-depth controls such as database monitoring and network segmentation
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to build SQL statements
- Code review checks for request parameters flowing into query builders or identifier positions
- Searching for dynamic uses of
table,column,xColumn, andyColumnin controller-to-database paths - Policy enforcement requiring prepared statements and approved query-builder APIs
- Dynamic testing with safe, non-destructive injection markers in isolated environments
- Database activity monitoring for unusual query structures, access patterns, or privilege use
Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify
common injection patterns, but findings should be validated against actual data flows.

