Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in SIGA's HTML-to-PDF endpoint allows a remotely initiated request to influence the URL retrieved by the application.
When the endpoint processes attacker-controlled URL input, the server may make requests to unintended external or internal resources, potentially exposing services that are not directly reachable by the attacker.
Affected context
The issue affects SIGA deployments using the HTML-to-PDF functionality and the DownloadExterno.getUrl function in ExUtilController.java. It becomes risky when the endpoint accepts attacker-influenced URL or HTML-related input and the application can reach internal, restricted, or otherwise sensitive network destinations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remotely accessible HTML-to-PDF endpoint
- Required access: Ability to submit requests to the endpoint; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled URL-related input by
DownloadExterno.getUrl - Why exploitation is possible: The server may retrieve a destination selected by the requester without sufficiently restricting permitted schemes, hosts, ports, or network ranges
Why this happens
The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation and authorization of server-side outbound requests. When application logic uses user-controlled URL data to retrieve remote content without enforcing a narrowly defined destination policy, an attacker can redirect the server toward unintended resources.
This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, in which trusted server-side network access is misused to reach external or internal destinations selected through untrusted input.
Potential impact
- An attacker may access internal HTTP services that are not publicly exposed
- Sensitive response data could be returned through the application
- Cloud or infrastructure metadata may be exposed where reachable
- Internal services could receive unauthorized requests
- Network reconnaissance or follow-on attacks could become easier
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied destinations and enforcing explicit outbound request boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only narrowly defined schemes, hosts, ports, and URL paths
- Preferencing an explicit allowlist of approved remote resources over denylist filtering
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, reserved, and infrastructure-management address ranges
- Validating resolved IP addresses and rechecking them after redirects or DNS resolution
- Disabling unnecessary redirects and unsupported URL schemes
- Separating outbound-fetching components from sensitive internal networks
- Applying network egress controls and least-privilege service permissions
- Avoiding the return of raw upstream responses or detailed network errors to users
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules for outbound HTTP clients receiving request-derived URLs
- Code review checks covering URL validation, redirect handling, DNS resolution, and private-address filtering
- Dynamic testing with controlled external endpoints and blocked internal-address test cases
- Network monitoring for unexpected egress from the application and access attempts against private or metadata ranges
- Policy enforcement requiring approved destination allowlists for server-side fetch features
- Automated security review tools that identify user-controlled data flowing into network request APIs

