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CVE-2026-86263

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Authorization Bypass (CWE-639) in hosp_order Cancel

CVE-2026-86263

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass

CWE:

CWE-285, CWE-639

Impact:

Unauthorized order cancellation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A high-severity authorization flaw in hosp_order allows a remote attacker to manipulate the order ID supplied to the order-cancellation function. When authorization is not properly tied to the requested order, an attacker may cancel orders they are not permitted to manage.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the Order Cancellation component, specifically in the

orderRecordsService.cancelOrder path of OrderController.java. It may affect

deployments using the referenced rolling-release code when the cancellation

endpoint accepts a user-controlled order ID without reliably verifying that the

requester is authorized to act on that order.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remotely accessible order-cancellation functionality
  • Required access: Ability to reach the cancellation endpoint, potentially with a valid account or session depending on deployment controls
  • Trigger point: Processing of the order ID argument by cancelOrder
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization may be evaluated without binding the requested record to the caller's permitted scope, allowing a modified identifier to reference another order

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure involving a

user-controlled record identifier. The application appears to process the

selected order based on the supplied ID without consistently confirming that

the requester has permission to cancel that specific record. This maps most

directly to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and

is also related to CWE-285: Improper Authorization.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may cancel orders belonging to other users or business units.
  • Order fulfillment, customer service, or inventory workflows could be disrupted.
  • The application may expose unauthorized changes to order state.
  • Business records and operational reporting could become inconsistent.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization at the

service layer rather than trusting identifiers supplied by clients.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Checking ownership, tenant membership, role, and workflow permissions for every cancellation request.
  • Resolving records through an authorization-scoped query instead of fetching by an unrestricted identifier.
  • Applying deny-by-default policies and least privilege to order-management operations.
  • Treating client-supplied IDs as untrusted references and validating them against the authenticated principal.
  • Returning consistent authorization failures without revealing whether unrelated records exist.
  • Using transaction and workflow controls to prevent unauthorized state transitions.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis rules that identify controller or service methods using request-provided IDs in data-access operations without adjacent authorization checks.
  • Code review checks for missing ownership, tenant, role, or relationship validation before state-changing actions.
  • Dynamic tests that attempt to access and cancel records across user, tenant, and role boundaries.
  • Policy enforcement requiring object-level authorization for endpoints that modify or delete records.
  • Audit monitoring for repeated cancellation attempts involving unrelated or sequential identifiers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/sfturing/hosp_order/
github.comgithub.com/sfturing/hosp_order/issues/116
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-86263
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/902242
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/399409
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/399409/cti

Frequently asked

questions

The reported issue may be triggered remotely through the order-cancellation

functionality. Exploitability depends on network exposure and the level of

access required to reach that functionality.

The available description does not establish whether authentication is required.

In deployments that protect the endpoint, an attacker would generally need

sufficient access to submit cancellation requests; the core weakness is the

missing authorization check for the selected order.

Enforce object-level authorization for every cancellation request, using the

authenticated user's identity, tenant, role, and workflow permissions when

resolving the target order.

Treat all record identifiers as untrusted, use authorization-scoped data

access, test cross-user and cross-tenant boundaries, and monitor sensitive

state-changing operations.

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