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CVE-2026-86167

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Tenda HG10 Boa CGI

CVE-2026-86167

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

A critical OS command injection vulnerability affects the Boa web component in the Tenda HG10 router. A remote attacker may be able to manipulate the fmgpon_loid parameter and cause the device to execute operating-system commands when the vulnerable form handler processes the request.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the formgponConf handler at /boaform/admin/formgponConf on affected Tenda HG10 firmware. Risk is present when the Boa web interface is reachable by an attacker and the handler incorporates the fmgpon_loid value into an operating-system command without adequate separation, validation, or escaping.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The Boa HTTP administration interface and its formgponConf request handler
  • Required access: Network reachability to the exposed web service; authentication requirements depend on the device's access controls and deployment configuration
  • Trigger point: Processing of the fmgpon_loid argument
  • Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input reaches an operating-system command execution path without sufficient command isolation
  • Scope: Remote exploitation is possible where the vulnerable management interface is accessible

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper neutralization of special elements in externally supplied input used to construct or invoke an operating-system command. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'). CWE-77, which covers improper command construction, is also related because the application appears to combine untrusted parameter data with command-processing logic rather than treating the value strictly as data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Boa service
  • The device could be taken over or rendered unavailable
  • Configuration, credentials, or network information could be exposed
  • The compromised router could be used for lateral movement or additional attacks
  • Device traffic could be monitored, redirected, or disrupted

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request-processing paths and reducing trust in administrative inputs.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer direct APIs or fixed argument arrays instead of shell command construction
  • Enforce strict allowlists and type-aware validation for configuration values
  • Keep user-controlled data separate from executable command structure
  • Restrict administrative interfaces to trusted management networks and require strong access controls
  • Run web-management services with the least privileges necessary
  • Apply network segmentation and disable unnecessary remote administration exposure
  • Use read-only or constrained execution environments where practical

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for command-injection risks through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying request parameters passed to shell, process-spawn, or command-wrapper APIs
  • Code review checks for string concatenation or interpolation involving HTTP parameters and system commands
  • Tests that verify special characters are rejected or treated strictly as data
  • Web-application firewall or gateway policies monitoring suspicious command metacharacters in administrative requests
  • Device and network telemetry showing unexpected management requests, process launches, outbound connections, or configuration changes
  • Automated security review tools that flag untrusted input reaching command-execution sinks

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/SunnyYANGyaya/cuicuishark-sheep-fishIOT/blob/main/Tenda/HG10/command-formgponConf-fmgpon_loid.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-86167
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/895596
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/399306
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/399306/cti
tenda.com.cntenda.com.cn/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Remote exploitation may be possible when the affected Boa management endpoint is reachable over the network. The practical scope depends on interface exposure, authentication, and network controls.

Not necessarily. The required access depends on how the device exposes and protects the administration interface. Network reachability alone may be sufficient in some deployments, while others may require authenticated access.

Avoid passing request data through a shell or command interpreter. Use fixed command structures, direct system APIs, strict allowlists, and least-privilege service execution.

Treat all web parameters as untrusted, review every path from request input to process execution, enforce management-network restrictions, and use static analysis and runtime monitoring to detect unsafe command construction.

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