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CVE-2026-85719

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Proxy Credential Exposure (CWE-319) in AsyncHttpClient

CVE-2026-85719

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cleartext Credential Transmission

CWE:

CWE-319, CWE-522

Impact:

Proxy Credential Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

AsyncHttpClient can attach authenticated SOCKS proxy credentials to requests without verifying that the connection is using an HTTP proxy. A malicious or unintended origin may therefore receive credentials, including reversible Basic credentials or negotiated NTLM, Kerberos, and SPNEGO authentication material.

Affected context

The issue affects AsyncHttpClient applications using authenticated SOCKS proxies within the affected release ranges. Risk arises when proxy authentication is handled by the Netty request factory or sender without confirming the proxy protocol, allowing proxy authorization data to travel through a request path where the origin can observe it.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Outbound HTTP requests made through an authenticated SOCKS proxy
  • Required access: The attacker generally controls, impersonates, or can cause traffic to reach a hostile origin
  • Trigger point: Preemptive proxy authentication or processing of an origin-generated HTTP 407 response
  • Why exploitation is possible: Proxy credentials are attached or forwarded without reliably establishing that the destination is an HTTP proxy rather than an origin reached through a SOCKS tunnel

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a failure to bind proxy-authentication behavior to the correct proxy protocol and trust boundary. Code paths attach Proxy-Authorization or forward negotiated credentials based on authentication state without confirming that the recipient is an HTTP proxy. This maps primarily to CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information, because credentials can be sent over a plaintext request to an unintended recipient, and is also related to CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials.

Potential impact

  • An origin may capture proxy usernames and passwords
  • Basic authentication values may be readily reversible if intercepted
  • NTLM, Kerberos, or SPNEGO credentials may be disclosed to an unauthorized endpoint
  • Stolen proxy credentials could enable unauthorized network access or traffic interception
  • Applications may experience broader credential compromise through reuse of exposed secrets

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that proxy credentials are sent only to an explicitly verified HTTP proxy endpoint.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Binding authentication handlers to the negotiated proxy protocol and connection context
  • Disabling preemptive proxy authentication unless the destination and transport are explicitly trusted
  • Preventing origin responses from triggering proxy-credential forwarding through a SOCKS tunnel
  • Limiting proxy credentials to dedicated, least-privileged accounts with narrow network scope
  • Avoiding reusable Basic credentials where stronger, scoped authentication mechanisms are available
  • Protecting outbound traffic with encrypted, authenticated channels and minimizing credential reuse

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis for unconditional Proxy-Authorization attachment
  • Code review of proxy authentication interceptors and protocol-selection logic
  • Tests that use hostile origins to verify that 407 responses cannot cause credential leakage through SOCKS
  • Network monitoring for proxy credentials appearing in requests addressed to origin hosts
  • Policy enforcement requiring explicit proxy-protocol validation before sensitive headers are emitted

Automated security review tools may help identify credential propagation across proxy and origin request paths.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/4d887704dec22027310f66c81503226722e9bd23
github.comgithub.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/718ed2e86126663a88ea3db7a88cbbf93f0069b5
github.comgithub.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/abaa8bd260beda3b85825ff95069ed11eaf4ca8d
github.comgithub.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/commit/be439b2ec773d12d61914c238d3e8eeaa6f0ba21
github.comgithub.com/AsyncHttpClient/async-http-client/security/advisories/GHSA-x5w6-vm3f-pp6f

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation may be possible when an attacker can operate or influence an origin that receives requests from a vulnerable client using an authenticated SOCKS proxy.

The application must make outbound requests through an authenticated SOCKS proxy, and the attacker must be able to attract traffic to an origin capable of observing or eliciting the credential-bearing request.

Ensure proxy credentials are emitted only after the connection is verified to represent the intended HTTP proxy protocol and never forward them in response to an origin's authentication challenge through a SOCKS tunnel.

Use protocol-aware authentication handlers, test hostile-origin and proxy-boundary cases, minimize reusable credentials, and enforce outbound network policies that restrict where authentication data may be sent.

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