Summary
Trigger.dev fails to verify that a replayed task run belongs to the environment selected for the replay operation. An authenticated attacker may inject their own runs into another organization's or project's environment, consuming resources and polluting operational history when they can access the replay functionality.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Trigger.dev deployments that support run replay operations without adequately validating environment membership. It becomes risky when an authenticated user can reference an environment outside their authorized organization or project and the replay workflow accepts that reference without an effective authorization check.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated run replay functionality
- Required access: A valid account with permission to initiate or access replay operations
- Trigger point: Submission of a replay request targeting an environment identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The replay workflow does not consistently verify that the requester belongs to the selected environment
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a multi-tenant resource operation. The application validates that the requester is authenticated but does not sufficiently enforce object-level membership before associating a replayed run with the target environment. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because access-control enforcement is absent or incomplete for a protected environment resource.
Potential impact
- An attacker may consume compute, storage, or execution resources belonging to another environment.
- Run history could be polluted with unauthorized task executions.
- Operational monitoring and incident investigation may be made less reliable.
- Victim projects or organizations could incur unexpected usage or service costs.
- Cross-tenant isolation could be weakened within the affected deployment.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every environment
boundary involved in replay operations.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target environment from an authorized server-side context where possible.
- Enforcing organization, project, and environment membership checks before replay processing.
- Applying deny-by-default authorization policies to cross-tenant resource references.
- Rechecking authorization at the service layer rather than relying only on client-side controls.
- Limiting execution, concurrency, and resource quotas so an individual account cannot easily consume shared capacity.
- Recording authorization decisions and replay targets for audit and anomaly review.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for replay handlers that accept user-controlled environment identifiers.
- Tests that attempt cross-organization and cross-project object access with authenticated accounts.
- Policy checks requiring server-side membership validation before task execution or resource association.
- Audit-log analysis for replay requests whose requester, project, and environment identities do not align.
- Automated security review tools that identify missing object-level authorization checks.

