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CVE-2026-85651

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Trigger.dev Replay

CVE-2026-85651

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Cross-tenant resource abuse and data integrity impact

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Trigger.dev fails to verify that a replayed task run belongs to the environment selected for the replay operation. An authenticated attacker may inject their own runs into another organization's or project's environment, consuming resources and polluting operational history when they can access the replay functionality.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Trigger.dev deployments that support run replay operations without adequately validating environment membership. It becomes risky when an authenticated user can reference an environment outside their authorized organization or project and the replay workflow accepts that reference without an effective authorization check.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated run replay functionality
  • Required access: A valid account with permission to initiate or access replay operations
  • Trigger point: Submission of a replay request targeting an environment identifier
  • Why exploitation is possible: The replay workflow does not consistently verify that the requester belongs to the selected environment

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a multi-tenant resource operation. The application validates that the requester is authenticated but does not sufficiently enforce object-level membership before associating a replayed run with the target environment. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because access-control enforcement is absent or incomplete for a protected environment resource.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may consume compute, storage, or execution resources belonging to another environment.
  • Run history could be polluted with unauthorized task executions.
  • Operational monitoring and incident investigation may be made less reliable.
  • Victim projects or organizations could incur unexpected usage or service costs.
  • Cross-tenant isolation could be weakened within the affected deployment.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every environment

boundary involved in replay operations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving the target environment from an authorized server-side context where possible.
  • Enforcing organization, project, and environment membership checks before replay processing.
  • Applying deny-by-default authorization policies to cross-tenant resource references.
  • Rechecking authorization at the service layer rather than relying only on client-side controls.
  • Limiting execution, concurrency, and resource quotas so an individual account cannot easily consume shared capacity.
  • Recording authorization decisions and replay targets for audit and anomaly review.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for replay handlers that accept user-controlled environment identifiers.
  • Tests that attempt cross-organization and cross-project object access with authenticated accounts.
  • Policy checks requiring server-side membership validation before task execution or resource association.
  • Audit-log analysis for replay requests whose requester, project, and environment identities do not align.
  • Automated security review tools that identify missing object-level authorization checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev
github.comgithub.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/34b1a181c2a1d33a53ebab88f84b05f81fea4254
github.comgithub.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/issues/4173
github.comgithub.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.2
github.comgithub.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-qxpp-qjg8-x4jv
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/trigger-dev-before-4.5.2-unauthorized-environment-access-via-run-replay

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the application's authenticated replay interface when that interface is reachable by the attacker and does not enforce environment membership correctly.

The attacker generally needs a valid authenticated account with access to initiate or invoke run replay operations. Anonymous access is not required by the described behavior.

Enforce server-side, object-level authorization for the target organization, project, and environment before accepting or executing every replay request.

Use deny-by-default authorization, test cross-tenant access boundaries, avoid trusting client-supplied ownership context, and monitor replay activity for identity and resource mismatches.

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