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CVE-2026-85525

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in Snowflake Drivers

CVE-2026-85525

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295, CWE-347

Impact:

Man-in-the-middle interception and modification of TLS-protected data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A certificate validation vulnerability in Snowflake's Python, Go, JDBC, and Node.js drivers could cause a revoked TLS certificate to be accepted as valid. An on-path attacker who possesses the revoked certificate's private key may establish an attacker-controlled connection and read or modify data transmitted through that session.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Snowflake driver connections that validate server certificates through OCSP responses. Risk is present when certificate-status responses are not reliably bound to the certificate under validation and definitive verification failures are handled as if they were temporary conditions. Exploitation is limited to connections for Snowflake or stage hostnames where the attacker has both an on-path position and the corresponding private key.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: TLS connections established by the affected Snowflake drivers
  • Required access: An on-path network position and possession of a revoked server certificate's private key
  • Trigger point: OCSP-based certificate validation during TLS session establishment
  • Why exploitation is possible: The driver may accept a revoked certificate when OCSP validation does not bind the response to the certificate correctly or treats a definitive verification failure as transient

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper certificate validation, mapped primarily to CWE-295. Certificate-status responses were not consistently verified as belonging to the certificate being assessed, and conclusive validation failures could be treated as recoverable conditions. This weakens the trust decision made during TLS negotiation and is also related to CWE-347, which covers improper verification of cryptographic signatures or authenticity evidence.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read data transmitted through an intercepted driver connection
  • An attacker could modify requests or responses within the affected TLS session
  • Credentials, queries, results, or other connection-scoped data may be exposed
  • The attacker may impersonate a Snowflake or stage endpoint for the duration of the connection

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that certificate revocation and authenticity checks fail closed when validation is inconclusive or definitively unsuccessful.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using driver builds that implement robust certificate-to-OCSP response binding and strict failure handling
  • Treating definitive OCSP or certificate validation failures as connection-blocking errors
  • Avoiding fallback behavior that converts verification failures into transient network conditions
  • Restricting outbound network paths and monitoring unexpected TLS interception
  • Applying least privilege to credentials and sessions so intercepted connections expose less data
  • Maintaining an inventory of driver components and applying security updates through controlled deployment processes

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of weakness through:

  • Static and dependency analysis that identifies custom certificate-validation and OCSP handling
  • Code review signals such as certificate-status checks that do not bind responses to the validated certificate
  • Tests covering revoked certificates, mismatched OCSP responses, malformed responses, and definitive verification failures
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected certificate changes, TLS interception indicators, or connections through unauthorized proxies
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved driver components and fail-closed TLS validation behavior

Automated security review tools can help identify weak certificate-validation logic, but findings should be confirmed against the driver's complete trust and revocation workflow.

Sources

SourceLink
docs.snowflake.comdocs.snowflake.com/en/release-notes/clients-drivers/golang-2026
docs.snowflake.comdocs.snowflake.com/en/release-notes/clients-drivers/jdbc-2026
docs.snowflake.comdocs.snowflake.com/en/release-notes/clients-drivers/nodejs-2026
github.comgithub.com/snowflakedb/snowflake-connector-python/releases/tag/v4.7.3

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation can affect a remote client connection, but it is not generally exploitable by an arbitrary remote attacker. The attacker must be on the network path and possess the private key corresponding to a revoked certificate for the relevant Snowflake or stage hostname.

The attacker needs an on-path position capable of influencing the TLS connection and the private key for the revoked certificate. The impact is limited to data carried within the intercepted connection.

Use a driver implementation that correctly binds OCSP responses to the certificate being validated and fails closed on definitive certificate or revocation-checking errors.

Test certificate validation against revoked, mismatched, malformed, and unavailable OCSP responses; enforce approved driver policies; monitor TLS paths; and minimize the privileges and data exposure of individual connections.

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