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CVE-2026-85451

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Hard-Coded Credentials (CWE-798) in MOOS SuicidalSleeper

CVE-2026-85451

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hard-Coded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Remote Process Termination and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MOOS core-moos contains a hard-coded passphrase in the SuicidalSleeper component, which uses it to authorize multicast process-control commands. A peer that can reach the configured multicast network may use the known passphrase to enumerate MOOS processes and request their termination, disrupting services.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in MOOS deployments using the SuicidalSleeper component with its default multicast group and port. Risk is higher when untrusted or insufficiently isolated hosts can reach the multicast channel and the component relies on the embedded passphrase for command authorization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The MOOS multicast command channel
  • Required access: Network reachability to the configured multicast group and port
  • Trigger point: Processing of an authorized process-termination command
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authorization secret is hard-coded and therefore discoverable, allowing reachable peers to issue commands accepted by the component

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is the inclusion of a fixed authentication secret in application logic for authorizing sensitive multicast commands. Because the credential is shared, static, and not independently provisioned per deployment or peer, anyone who can obtain the software and reach the command channel may be able to reuse it. This behavior maps to CWE-798, Use of Hard-coded Credentials.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may terminate selected MOOS processes remotely.
  • Critical robotics or distributed-control services could be disrupted.
  • Repeated termination requests could cause denial of service.
  • Unexpected shutdowns could interrupt operations, monitoring, or recovery workflows.
  • A compromised multicast-reachable host could affect other trusted peers.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared embedded secrets from

authorization decisions and reducing exposure of the multicast control

plane.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using securely provisioned, rotatable credentials or peer-specific authentication.
  • Requiring authenticated and integrity-protected control messages.
  • Restricting multicast membership and filtering traffic at network boundaries.
  • Separating control traffic from untrusted or broadly reachable networks.
  • Applying least privilege to MOOS processes and limiting which components can terminate peers.
  • Using fail-safe authorization and explicit allowlists for sensitive process-control operations.
  • Avoiding default credentials and treating configuration secrets as deployment-managed values.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this vulnerability through:

  • Static analysis searches for hard-coded passwords, passphrases, or authentication tokens.
  • Code review checks covering multicast command handlers and process-control authorization.
  • Dependency and source audits for embedded default credentials in distributed components.
  • Network monitoring for unexpected multicast process-enumeration or termination commands.
  • Policy enforcement that blocks sensitive control protocols from untrusted network segments.
  • Automated security review tools that flag credential literals and unauthenticated administrative commands.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos/blob/ec9c77c68fcbdef8f5e4c60fe243acd223433f0c/Core/libMOOS/Comms/SuicidalSleeper.cpp#L45
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos/commit/488806a07db9f21eea124f48a9c0392f058f01dc
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos/pull/85
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/moos-core-moos-through-10.4.0-remote-process-termination-via-hard-coded-multicast-passphrase

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable over the network when an attacker has multicast

reachability to the MOOS command channel and can use the embedded passphrase.

The attacker may not need separately provisioned credentials because the

hard-coded passphrase is shared by the component and can be recovered from

the software.

Replace embedded shared authorization secrets with securely provisioned,

rotatable credentials and require authenticated, integrity-protected

control messages.

Scan source code and built artifacts for credential literals, restrict

multicast control traffic, review sensitive command handlers, and enforce

least-privilege policies for process-management operations.

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