Summary
MOOS-IvP's alogsplit utility contains an operating system command injection vulnerability when processing log file pathnames or the --dir parameter. If an attacker can control these path values and an operator runs alogsplit, shell metacharacters may cause arbitrary commands to execute with the operator's privileges.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the alogsplit log-processing workflow, specifically when the SplitHandler::handlePreCheckSplitDir() function handles log directories or file pathnames. Deployments become at risk when attacker-influenced names or command-line arguments reach shell-interpreted operations without strict validation or without being passed through an execution interface that avoids shell evaluation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The alogsplit utility's log pathname and
--dirhandling. - Required access: The ability to create, rename, place, or otherwise influence log files or to supply the directory argument.
- Trigger point: Processing a controlled path during alogsplit's pre-check and split-directory handling.
- Why exploitation is possible: Shell metacharacters are not adequately sanitized before path data reaches a command-execution context.
- Privilege context: Any resulting commands may run with the operating-system privileges of the operator executing alogsplit.
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper neutralization of special elements used in an operating-system command. Pathnames and directory arguments are treated as data but reach a shell-sensitive execution path without sufficient separation from command syntax.
This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, commonly called OS command injection. The insecure pattern is constructing or invoking shell commands with externally influenced values rather than using argument-safe process APIs and strict input handling.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands.
- The attacker could access, modify, or delete files available to the operator account.
- The vulnerable process may be used to alter logs or disrupt log-processing workflows.
- Credentials, configuration data, or other sensitive information may be exposed.
- A compromised operator context could enable further access to connected systems.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that path values remain data throughout processing.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using process-spawning APIs that pass arguments directly without invoking a shell.
- Applying allowlist-based validation for directory and filename components.
- Treating log filenames and command-line parameters as untrusted input unless their provenance is enforced.
- Avoiding string concatenation when building commands or subprocess arguments.
- Restricting alogsplit execution to a dedicated least-privilege account.
- Limiting filesystem permissions and access to directories processed by the utility.
- Separating log ingestion from privileged operational workflows where feasible.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for shell command construction involving pathnames, filenames, or command-line arguments.
- Code review checks for shell invocation APIs, string concatenation, and insufficient escaping.
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes launched by alogsplit.
- Audit policies that restrict shell execution from log-processing components.
- Testing with adversarial path inputs in isolated environments to verify that values are not interpreted as shell syntax.
- Automated security review tools that flag command execution with externally influenced data.

