/

CVE-2026-85424

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in MOOS core-moos Protocol

CVE-2026-85424

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized privileged operations and denial of service

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MOOS core-moos through version 10.4.0 does not authenticate clients connecting through its wire protocol. An unauthenticated client may connect with an arbitrary name and obtain publish, subscribe, and database-clearing privileges, including the ability to reset variables and clear client mail queues.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments using the MOOS core-moos wire protocol without an effective runtime authentication boundary. Systems are particularly exposed when the protocol is reachable by untrusted or insufficiently isolated networks, because the compile-time protocol string check does not establish the identity or authorization of connecting clients.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: MOOS wire-protocol listener
  • Required access: Network connectivity to a reachable MOOS service; valid authentication is not required
  • Trigger point: Client connection followed by privileged publish, subscribe, or database operations
  • Why exploitation is possible: The protocol accepts clients without verifying identity or authorization, allowing arbitrary client names and privileged requests

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is missing authentication and authorization at the wire-protocol boundary. Client-supplied connection information is treated as sufficient to establish a trusted session, while the compile-time protocol string check does not prove client identity or limit capabilities. This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because sensitive operations can be reached without an effective authentication step.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized clients may publish misleading or malicious data
  • Attackers could subscribe to information exposed through the MOOS database
  • Database variables may be reset or removed
  • Client mail queues could be cleared, causing service disruption
  • Dependent autonomy, robotics, or monitoring workflows could behave unpredictably

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on adding a strong trust boundary around the MOOS wire protocol and reducing the privileges available to unauthenticated or low-trust clients.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Requiring authenticated client identities before accepting protocol sessions
  • Enforcing server-side authorization for publish, subscribe, and database-clear operations
  • Restricting protocol exposure to trusted network segments or private interfaces
  • Applying network access controls, segmentation, and mutually authenticated transport where supported
  • Separating administrative operations from routine client capabilities
  • Running related services with least privilege and limiting the impact of database resets
  • Treating client names and protocol strings as untrusted metadata rather than proof of identity

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this risk through:

  • Static analysis and code review for connection handlers that accept sessions without identity verification
  • Tests confirming that unauthenticated clients cannot publish, subscribe, or invoke destructive database operations
  • Network monitoring for unexpected MOOS protocol connections or arbitrary client-name patterns
  • Policy checks requiring authentication and authorization for control-plane services
  • Review of firewall, segmentation, and service-binding configurations to identify unintended protocol exposure
  • Automated security testing that exercises privileged operations from unauthenticated sessions

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos/blob/ec9c77c68fcbdef8f5e4c60fe243acd223433f0c/Core/libMOOS/DB/MOOSDB.cpp#L1163
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos/commit/5ff5cdec44242156a168cc1a545a6a21357bd3ac
github.comgithub.com/themoos/core-moos/pull/84
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/moos-core-moos-through-10.4.0-missing-authentication-for-moosdb-publish-subscribe-and-db-clear

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the MOOS wire-protocol service is network-reachable by an unauthenticated party. Exploitability depends on network exposure and segmentation.

No. The described weakness allows clients to connect without effective authentication, although network access to the service is still required.

Require authenticated client identities and enforce server-side authorization for every privileged operation, especially database-clearing functions.

Treat network reachability as untrusted, use defense-in-depth segmentation, test anonymous access in CI and security assessments, and ensure destructive operations require separate authorization.

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