Summary
MISP's email-based one-time password flow allowed unlimited verification attempts while an OTP remained valid. An attacker who had reached the OTP challenge, typically after obtaining the user's primary credentials, could repeatedly guess the code and potentially bypass the additional authentication factor.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in MISP deployments using email-based OTP authentication when the OTP verification endpoint does not enforce per-user or per-session attempt limits. Because the OTP is associated with the user rather than a single pending login session, multiple concurrent sessions may be able to submit guesses against the same valid code.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: MISP's email OTP verification endpoint
- Required access: Valid primary authentication credentials or another means of reaching the OTP verification stage
- Trigger point: Repeated submission of candidate OTP values while the issued OTP remains valid
- Why exploitation is possible: The verification flow permits unrestricted attempts and may allow concurrent sessions to test guesses against the same user-associated OTP
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient enforcement of authentication attempt limits during OTP verification. The endpoint validated submitted codes without consistently applying the application's brute-force protection controls, allowing repeated guesses against a live authentication factor. This maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, where an authentication mechanism fails to limit failed attempts or invalidate the factor after a defined threshold.
Potential impact
- An attacker could guess a valid OTP and bypass the additional authentication factor.
- Unauthorized access to the affected user's MISP account could occur.
- Compromised accounts may enable access to sensitive threat intelligence or administrative functions.
- Multiple concurrent sessions could increase the practical guessing capacity against one active OTP.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing bounded, state-aware authentication attempts and reducing the value of captured or reusable OTP challenges.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Apply centralized brute-force protection to every OTP verification path.
- Track failed attempts against the relevant user and pending authentication transaction.
- Invalidate the active OTP when the configured failure budget is exhausted.
- Bind OTP challenges to a specific login session where practical.
- Prevent blocked or rate-limited users from requesting replacement OTPs.
- Use constant-time comparison for secret values and validate input types before comparison.
- Apply least privilege to authenticated accounts and require stronger controls for administrative access.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for authentication endpoints lacking rate limiting or lockout handling.
- Tests that submit repeated invalid OTPs and verify rejection after a defined threshold.
- Review of whether OTP state is bound to a user, session, device, or transaction.
- Monitoring for bursts of failed OTP submissions, repeated requests from multiple sessions, and OTP requests following account blocking.
- Policy enforcement requiring centralized authentication throttling for all second-factor verification paths.
- Neutral automated security review tools that identify missing attempt controls and weak authentication-state handling.

