Summary
MISP's CurlClient may fail to verify TLS peer certificates when its verification setting is left at its default value, allowing HTTPS connections to accept untrusted certificates. An attacker who can intercept or manipulate traffic between MISP and a remote HTTPS service could impersonate that service, observe sensitive data, or alter responses.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in MISP deployments that use affected CurlClient instances to communicate with remote HTTPS services while TLS peer verification is not explicitly enabled. Risk is higher when those connections transmit authentication material, threat intelligence, synchronization data, or other sensitive information, and when an attacker can influence the network path.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Outbound HTTPS connections initiated by MISP's CurlClient
- Required access: Ability to intercept, redirect, or manipulate traffic between MISP and the remote service
- Trigger point: A CurlClient request made with peer verification left at its ineffective default
- Why exploitation is possible: The client may accept a certificate that is not trusted by the configured certificate authority, allowing endpoint impersonation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an insecure default caused by an uninitialized verification property. Because the null value was passed into cURL, TLS peer verification could be disabled unless calling code explicitly enabled it. This maps to CWE-295, Improper Certificate Validation, where a client fails to adequately authenticate the certificate presented by a remote endpoint.
Potential impact
- An attacker could impersonate a trusted remote HTTPS service.
- Sensitive MISP credentials, tokens, or threat intelligence could be exposed.
- Responses received by MISP could be modified or substituted.
- Synchronization data or other remotely sourced content could be manipulated.
- The affected integration could experience unauthorized actions or data corruption.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making certificate and peer verification
enabled by default for every HTTPS client.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use secure TLS client defaults that require peer and hostname verification.
- Treat explicitly configured self-signed or private certificates as trusted only when they are pinned or validated through a controlled CA configuration.
- Ensure special-case synchronization logic disables verification only when no trusted pinned CA is configured, and avoid broad verification bypasses.
- Centralize TLS policy so individual callers cannot silently weaken verification.
- Reduce the sensitivity and privileges of credentials used by outbound integrations.
- Protect network paths with segmentation and monitoring as defense in depth.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches can include:
- Static analysis for nullable, uninitialized, or false-valued TLS verification properties passed to cURL or equivalent HTTP libraries.
- Code review checks for disabled peer verification, permissive certificate modes, and hostname checks that are absent or conditionally bypassed.
- Policy enforcement requiring secure TLS defaults and documented exceptions for pinned private CAs.
- Integration tests that present untrusted, mismatched, expired, or self-signed certificates and verify that connections fail unless an approved CA is configured.
- Network monitoring for unexpected certificate issuers, endpoint changes, or outbound connections that bypass established TLS inspection policies.

