Summary
A broken authorization vulnerability in vhr allows authenticated users to update HR profiles they do not own by providing another profile identifier. This may let attackers alter personal information or disable accounts, including administrator accounts, when the endpoint does not verify ownership or role-based permissions.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the PUT /hr/info endpoint when the server accepts a profile ID from the request body but does not reliably confirm that the authenticated user is authorized to modify the referenced profile. Deployments are at risk when profile identifiers are predictable or discoverable and authorization checks are applied only to authentication rather than to the requested resource.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The authenticated PUT
/hr/infoAPI endpoint - Required access: A valid authenticated user account
- Trigger point: A profile update request containing a different user's profile identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint processes the supplied identifier without enforcing object-level authorization for the target profile
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure mapped to CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The application treats authentication as sufficient permission to update any profile selected by a client-supplied identifier, rather than deriving the target resource from the authenticated identity or enforcing an explicit role and ownership policy.
Potential impact
- Attackers may overwrite names, addresses, or other HR profile data.
- Attackers could disable accounts belonging to other users.
- Administrator accounts may be disabled, causing denial of service.
- Organizations may experience data integrity, privacy, and operational impacts.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing object-level authorization for every
profile update, independently of whether the requester is authenticated.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target profile from the authenticated session when self-service updates are intended.
- Enforcing explicit ownership, tenant, and role checks before allowing changes.
- Treating client-supplied identifiers as untrusted references rather than permission grants.
- Applying field-level authorization so sensitive attributes and account status require elevated privileges.
- Using least-privilege service identities and separating administrative profile operations from self-service functions.
- Returning consistent authorization failures without disclosing whether unrelated profiles exist.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and API security rules for database lookups keyed directly by request-controlled identifiers.
- Code review checks requiring authorization decisions after resource lookup and before mutation.
- Dynamic tests that use one authenticated account to request updates against another account's identifier.
- Policy enforcement requiring object-level authorization and field-level access controls for sensitive endpoints.
- Audit monitoring for profile updates where the actor identity differs from the modified profile owner or expected administrator scope.

