Summary
Label Studio does not consistently enforce organization ownership when its proxy API resolves storage URIs for tasks and projects. An attacker who can create or use a separate organization may be able to request presigned access or streamed contents for cloud storage objects belonging to another tenant.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Label Studio deployments where proxy API endpoints resolve task or project storage URIs and rely on organization context to restrict access. Risk is higher when a user can create an organization, invoke the relevant proxy functionality, and influence the URI supplied to the storage resolution workflow.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Label Studio proxy API endpoints that presign or stream storage objects
- Required access: An account with sufficient access to create or use a separate organization and invoke the affected endpoints
- Trigger point: Resolution of a caller-supplied or task-associated storage URI
- Why exploitation is possible: Organization filters are not applied consistently before the storage object is authorized or returned
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization-check failure caused by resolving storage URIs without reliably binding the requested object to the caller's organization. This behavior maps to CWE-639, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, because a user-controlled identifier or URI can influence access to a resource without an equivalent server-side ownership check. The insecure pattern is trusting object-location data before validating tenant scope, rather than deriving resource identity from an authorized, organization-bound record.
Potential impact
- An attacker may obtain presigned access to another tenant's cloud storage objects.
- An attacker could stream contents from storage belonging to a different organization.
- Confidential annotations, source files, or project assets may be exposed.
- The incident could increase the risk of privacy violations and cross-tenant compromise.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on making tenant authorization mandatory at every
storage access decision.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Derive storage object identity from server-side, organization-bound records rather than trusting arbitrary URIs.
- Enforce organization ownership checks before presigning, streaming, or resolving any object.
- Apply consistent authorization middleware across all proxy API paths and error cases.
- Use deny-by-default policies for cross-tenant resource resolution.
- Reduce input trust by validating URI schemes, buckets, prefixes, and object identifiers against an allowlisted storage configuration.
- Run storage access under identities with only the minimum required permissions.
- Avoid exposing broad bucket capabilities through application-level proxy endpoints.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches can include:
- Static analysis and code review rules that flag storage lookups based directly on request parameters.
- Review signals such as organization filters applied after URI resolution, authorization checks present on one proxy path but absent on another, or presigning performed before ownership validation.
- Integration tests that attempt to access equivalent resources across separate organizations and verify consistent denial.
- Runtime policy enforcement that records organization identifiers, requested storage locations, authorization decisions, and presign or stream operations.
- Alerts for repeated cross-organization access denials or requests targeting storage locations outside the caller's permitted scope.

