Summary
Craft CMS contains an authorization flaw in the site-specific entry deletion workflow. An authenticated user with several entry viewing, saving, and editing permissions, but without site-level deletion permission, may delete a canonical entry record or, in some configurations, the entire entry and its content.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Craft CMS installations using the affected ElementsController deletion workflow for entries. It becomes risky when a user can access and modify a provisional draft while lacking permission to delete the corresponding canonical entry for a site. The deletion may bypass the expected site-level authorization boundary and may not be recoverable through Craft's recycle bin.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated Craft CMS entry-management functionality
- Required access: Permissions to view entries and peer entries, save entries and peer entries, and edit the relevant site
- Missing permission: The user does not have
deleteEntriesForSite - Trigger point: Deletion of an entry through
ElementsController::actionDeleteForSite() - Why exploitation is possible: The controller authorizes deletion against a user-owned provisional draft, then propagates deletion to the canonical site record without independently checking the user's permission to delete that canonical record
Why this happens
The vulnerability is caused by a missing authorization check, corresponding to CWE-862. The deletion workflow validates authorization for a related provisional draft whose ownership rules are less restrictive, but it does not repeat the authorization decision for the canonical element being removed. This creates a confused authorization context in which permission to modify a draft is incorrectly treated as permission to permanently delete the authoritative entry or site record.
Potential impact
- An attacker may delete a canonical entry site record without the required site-level deletion permission
- A single-site entry and its associated content could be permanently removed
- Business, editorial, or customer data may become unavailable
- Data loss could disrupt publishing workflows and downstream integrations
- Deleted records may not be recoverable through the application's recycle-bin mechanism
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization for the exact resource and operation being performed.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Perform an independent permission check against the canonical element and target site before deletion
- Avoid deriving destructive-operation authorization from draft ownership or edit permissions
- Centralize authorization decisions so related-resource transitions cannot bypass policy
- Apply deny-by-default rules for destructive actions and require explicit site-level delete privileges
- Preserve audit records and use backups or recovery controls appropriate for irreversible data changes
- Limit administrative and editorial permissions according to least privilege
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for destructive operations that lack a same-resource authorization decision
- Review of controller paths that convert draft, preview, or related-element permissions into canonical-resource actions
- Tests that exercise users with edit or save permissions but without delete permissions
- Authorization policy checks requiring every delete operation to identify and validate its target resource and site
- Audit-log monitoring for deletion events performed by roles that should not have site-level deletion authority
Automated application-security review tools may help identify missing checks, but authorization tests should also verify the complete permission matrix.

