Summary
Craft CMS has an authorization flaw in the asset-move endpoint when the force=1 option is supplied. An authenticated user who lacks permission to manage another user's assets may be able to move their own assets into that user's folder and delete conflicting files.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Craft CMS deployments where authenticated users can access the asset-move functionality but are not granted peer-level asset permissions. Risk is present when the endpoint accepts a forced move without consistently verifying authorization for the destination folder or for deletion of conflicting files.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated asset-management HTTP endpoint - Required access: A valid user account with permission to manage at least
some assets, but without authorization over the target user's folder
- Trigger point: Asset move requests that include the force=1 option - Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint does not adequately enforce
authorization before moving assets or removing destination conflicts
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a missing authorization check on a state-changing operation. The endpoint appears to validate that the requester is authenticated or can manage the source asset, but does not consistently verify authorization for the destination location and forced deletion of conflicting files. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, where access controls are absent or not applied to a protected action.
Potential impact
- An attacker may move assets into folders controlled by other users.
- An attacker could delete conflicting files in unauthorized locations.
- Existing assets may be replaced or made unavailable.
- Content integrity and asset ownership boundaries may be weakened.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every state transition, including destination-folder access and conflict deletion. Secure-by-default behavior should reject forced operations unless the caller has explicit permission for every affected resource. Authorization decisions should be based on server-side identity and resource ownership rather than client-supplied parameters, with narrowly scoped privileges and clear separation between source, destination, and deletion permissions. Centralized policy enforcement and consistent checks across equivalent endpoints can reduce bypass paths.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include static analysis for state-changing handlers that lack centralized authorization calls, code review of endpoint branches controlled by force or override parameters, and tests that exercise cross-user source and destination combinations. Runtime monitoring can flag forced moves, deletions, and asset operations crossing ownership boundaries. Policy enforcement may require authorization tests for every destructive API action, and automated review tools can help identify inconsistent permission checks.

