Summary
LibreNMS contains an operating system command injection vulnerability in the AboutController, where the snmpget configuration value is passed to shell_exec() without adequate validation.
An authenticated administrator who can modify this configuration and access the /about endpoint may cause the server to execute commands with the privileges of the LibreNMS process.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in LibreNMS deployments where the AboutController processes a user-influenced snmpget configuration value and invokes it through a shell command. Risk depends on administrative access, the ability to change the relevant configuration, and access to the endpoint that triggers command execution.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: LibreNMS web application and the AboutController
- Required access: Authenticated administrator privileges sufficient to modify the
snmpgetconfiguration - Trigger point: A request to the
/aboutendpoint - Why exploitation is possible: The configured executable path is incorporated into a shell command without sufficient validation or separation from command execution semantics
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper neutralization of command-related input before it is passed to a shell execution function. By treating a configurable executable value as trusted command text, the application allows shell interpretation of attacker-influenced data.
This behavior maps to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, commonly known as command injection. The insecure pattern is constructing or invoking shell commands from values that have not been constrained to an approved executable and safely passed as discrete arguments.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the LibreNMS host
- The attacker could access, alter, or destroy monitoring data
- Application credentials and other secrets may be exposed
- The compromised host could be used for lateral movement
- Monitoring integrity and service availability may be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation for configurable executable paths and reducing trust in administrative configuration values.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process or library APIs that pass executable names and arguments separately
- Restrict executable configuration to an explicit allowlist of approved absolute paths
- Apply strict type, format, and path validation before values reach process execution
- Avoid using shell wrappers when a non-shell execution interface is available
- Limit the privileges available to the LibreNMS service account
- Restrict administrative access and protect configuration-changing operations with strong authentication and authorization
- Record and review changes to command-related configuration
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules identifying
shell_exec(), shell invocation, or command-construction code that incorporates configuration or request-derived values - Code review checks for executable paths or arguments concatenated into shell command strings
- Policies requiring allowlisted binaries and non-shell process execution interfaces
- Monitoring for unexpected changes to the
snmpgetsetting - Runtime detection of unusual child processes, command interpreters, or outbound connections from the LibreNMS service account
- Automated security review tools that flag command injection patterns during development

