Summary
A broken object-level authorization flaw in ToolJet allows workspace administrators to operate on database tables belonging to another workspace by altering the organizationId path parameter.
Under deployments where the affected table-management APIs are reachable, an authenticated attacker may create, view, or delete tables outside their authorized workspace.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in ToolJet deployments using table-management API endpoints that accept an organizationId path parameter. Risk exists when the server relies on that client-supplied identifier without verifying that it matches the authenticated administrator's current workspace and authorization scope.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated ToolJet table-management API requests
- Required access: A valid account with workspace administration privileges
- Trigger point: A request that includes an organizationId identifying the target workspace
- Why exploitation is possible: The API does not consistently bind the path organizationId to the authenticated user's authorized workspace before performing the requested table operation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure of object-level authorization. The application accepts a workspace identifier from the request path and uses it to select database resources without independently confirming that the authenticated principal is permitted to access that workspace.
This behavior maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, a condition in which a user-controlled identifier can select another user's or tenant's object without an effective authorization check.
Potential impact
- An attacker may view database tables belonging to another workspace.
- An attacker could create unauthorized tables in a different workspace.
- An attacker may delete tables and disrupt workspace data availability.
- Cross-tenant data exposure or integrity loss could occur.
- Security boundaries between ToolJet workspaces could be weakened.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the resource boundary rather than trusting identifiers supplied by clients.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the active workspace from the authenticated session or access token where practical.
- Verifying organization membership and the required operation-specific privilege on every table-management request.
- Applying server-side tenant scoping to all database queries and mutations.
- Failing closed when workspace identity, resource ownership, or authorization context is ambiguous.
- Using least-privilege roles for workspace administration and database operations.
- Avoiding reliance on client-side workspace selectors as an authorization control.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for authorization decisions based solely on path, query, or body identifiers.
- Review of handlers that fetch or mutate tenant-scoped resources without a nearby authorization check.
- API tests that use an authenticated principal from one workspace with object identifiers from another workspace.
- Policy enforcement requiring explicit tenant scoping for all database reads, creates, updates, and deletes.
- Audit-log monitoring for cross-workspace resource references, denied authorization decisions, and unusual table deletion activity.
- Automated security review tools that flag missing object-level access-control checks.

