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CVE-2026-82578

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

XXE (CWE-611) in XML Batch XPath Processing Service

CVE-2026-82578

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

XML External Entity (XXE) Injection

CWE:

CWE-611

Impact:

Data Exfiltration and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A high-severity XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability can occur when XML batch processing uses XPath with default JAXP settings that do not restrict entity resolution. An attacker who can submit or influence batch XML may exfiltrate accessible data or trigger denial-of-service conditions.

Affected context

The issue affects deployments where XML batch processing is enabled and XPath is selected for processing. Risk arises when raw batch input reaches a default XML parser configuration without restrictions on external entities, document type declarations, or external resource access.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: XML batch-processing input
  • Required access: Ability to submit or influence XML batch data
  • Trigger point: Parsing and XPath evaluation of the submitted XML
  • Why exploitation is possible: Default JAXP behavior may resolve external entities or access external resources when entity processing is not explicitly restricted

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an XML parser configuration that accepts entity resolution from untrusted input. When external general entities, parameter entities, or related document type features remain enabled, attacker-controlled XML can cause the parser to retrieve external resources or expand data during processing. This behavior maps to CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference.

Potential impact

  • Sensitive local or remotely accessible data may be exfiltrated
  • The processing service could make unintended outbound requests
  • Excessive entity expansion may cause denial of service
  • Application availability and dependent workflows could be disrupted
  • Exposed credentials or configuration data could support follow-on attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making XML parsing secure by default and reducing trust in batch input.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Disable external general entities, parameter entities, and external DTD loading
  • Restrict XML parser access to external schemas, entities, and network resources
  • Use hardened, namespace-aware parsers with narrowly scoped feature settings
  • Apply schema and size limits before expensive XPath processing
  • Prefer structured formats that do not support external entity resolution where practical
  • Run the processing component with least privilege and restricted outbound network access

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify XXE risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for XML parser factories using default or permissive settings
  • Code review checks for missing external-entity and DTD restrictions
  • Tests using harmless external-entity resolution and entity-expansion cases in isolated environments
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected outbound requests from XML-processing services
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved hardened parser configurations
  • Automated security review tools that flag unsafe JAXP feature combinations

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsma-26-253-01.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-26-253-01

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when an exposed batch-processing interface accepts attacker-controlled XML and the vulnerable XPath parsing path is enabled.

The attacker generally needs the ability to submit or modify XML batch input. The exact requirement depends on authentication, authorization, and network exposure controls.

Configure XML parsers to reject DTDs and external entities, block external resource access, and validate input before XPath evaluation.

Use hardened parser configurations as secure defaults, enforce parser policies in code review and CI, limit outbound connectivity, and test XML processing with adversarial inputs.

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