Summary
Bisheng through 2.6.0-fix2 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the unauthenticated workflow report callback endpoint. An attacker may submit arbitrary URLs to probe internal services or cloud metadata endpoints and retrieve responses through object storage when caller-controlled object names are accepted.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Bisheng deployments that expose the POST /api/v1/workflow/report/callback endpoint without authentication and allow request destinations to be selected by the caller. Risk is higher when the server can reach private network services, cloud metadata endpoints, or object storage and when outbound requests are not restricted by scheme, host, or network policy.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP POST request to the workflow report callback endpoint
- Required access: No authentication may be required when the endpoint is exposed
- Trigger point: Server-side processing of a caller-supplied callback URL
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint lacks adequate URL scheme restrictions, destination host filtering, and corresponding outbound network controls
- Response retrieval condition: Captured responses may be accessible through object storage using object names supplied by the caller
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is server-side request forgery caused by treating user-controlled URLs as trusted destinations. Without restricting protocols, validating destination hosts, and enforcing network-level egress controls, the server can be induced to make requests on an attacker's behalf. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, particularly where internal resources become reachable through an externally accessible application endpoint.
Potential impact
- An attacker may enumerate private network services
- Cloud instance metadata or temporary credentials could be exposed
- Internal service responses could be retrieved or disclosed
- Object storage may be abused to retain or expose captured responses
- Internal systems could be targeted through the vulnerable server's network position
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in callback destinations and limiting the server's ability to reach sensitive networks.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring authentication and authorization for callback operations
- Allowing only explicitly approved URL schemes and destination hosts
- Resolving and validating destinations before connection, including protections against DNS rebinding and private-address bypasses
- Blocking access to loopback, link-local, metadata, and other restricted address ranges
- Applying network egress policies that permit only necessary destinations
- Avoiding caller-controlled object names for response storage, or generating names server-side
- Using least-privilege identities for application and storage access
- Returning only the minimum response data required by the workflow
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches can include:
- Static analysis and code review checks for HTTP clients receiving URLs directly from request parameters
- Review signals involving missing authentication, unrestricted URL parsing, weak host validation, or direct response persistence
- Runtime monitoring for outbound requests to loopback, link-local, private, or metadata address ranges
- Egress policy enforcement and alerts for unexpected schemes, ports, destinations, and request volume
- Audit logging that correlates callback requests, resolved destinations, and object-storage writes
- Automated security review tools that identify common SSRF data flows and missing destination controls

