Summary
Quivr through version 0.0.322 does not properly verify prompt ownership in prompt endpoints. An authenticated user with read-only access to a shared brain may use an exposed prompt identifier to overwrite prompts, potentially changing behavior for other users of that brain.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Quivr deployments where prompt-management endpoints identify prompts by an object identifier but do not consistently confirm that the requesting user owns or is authorized to modify the referenced prompt. The risk is greater when read-only users can access shared brains that expose prompt identifiers and when those prompts influence behavior for multiple brain users.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated prompt-management endpoints
- Required access: A valid account with access to a shared brain, potentially with read-only privileges
- Trigger point: A request that attempts to modify a prompt referenced by identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint relies on the supplied identifier without enforcing ownership or an equivalent authorization check for the targeted prompt
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure mapped to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The application accepts a user-controlled prompt identifier and performs a modification without reliably verifying that the requester has permission to alter the referenced object. This insecure pattern allows access scope to be determined by an identifier rather than by an enforced relationship between the user, the brain, and the prompt.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may modify prompts owned by other users
- Shared brain behavior could be altered for multiple users
- System prompts may be overwritten or weakened
- Application responses and workflows could be manipulated
- Prompt integrity and trust in shared knowledge spaces could be reduced
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the object level for every prompt operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Verify ownership or an explicit modification permission for the prompt and its associated brain before any write operation
- Derive authorization context from the authenticated session rather than trusting client-supplied ownership data
- Use deny-by-default access policies for shared and read-only resources
- Limit prompt-management privileges according to least-privilege roles
- Avoid exposing identifiers as the sole basis for authorization decisions
- Apply consistent authorization checks across create, read, update, and delete endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and review rules that flag database updates keyed only by client-supplied identifiers
- Code review checks requiring object-level authorization before every prompt mutation
- Integration tests covering cross-user and cross-tenant access attempts
- Policy enforcement that distinguishes read, use, and modify permissions
- Audit logging for prompt changes, including the actor, target object, associated brain, and authorization result
- Neutral automated application-security review tools that test for insecure direct object references and authorization bypasses

