Summary
CVE-2026-81097 affects the execute_ruby tool, which is intended to provide a read-only Ruby sandbox but fails to restrict pseudo-terminal spawn entry points. A normal tool call may therefore start a shell and execute operating-system commands with the privileges of the server account.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in deployments using the execute_ruby tool with the affected sandbox design. The tool relies on a pattern denylist and replacements for selected process-spawning methods, but pseudo-terminal library spawn functions remain reachable and are not covered by those controls. Risk is present when an attacker can submit or cause execution of Ruby expressions through the tool interface.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The
execute_rubytool exposed by the application or server - Required access: Ability to invoke the tool or influence code submitted to it
- Trigger point: Ruby evaluation that reaches an unblocked pseudo-terminal spawn entry point
- Why exploitation is possible: The sandbox controls do not comprehensively restrict all process-creation APIs, allowing command execution outside the guarded Kernel methods
Why this happens
The underlying issue is incomplete enforcement of a security boundary around dynamic code execution. The sandbox depends on denylist matching and selective method replacement, but fails to account for alternate process-spawning APIs provided by the pseudo-terminal library. This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, because attacker-influenced tool execution can reach a shell or operating-system command path.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary commands as the account running the server
- Access to files, credentials, and environment data available to that account
- Modification or deletion of application data
- Further compromise of connected services or infrastructure
- Loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell-capable behavior from sandboxed execution rather than attempting to maintain a denylist of known APIs.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting permitted libraries and APIs to a small, data-only allowlist
- Blocking dynamic dispatch and all process, shell, and pseudo-terminal execution paths
- Using a separate, strongly isolated execution environment with minimal privileges
- Applying operating-system and container controls that limit filesystem, network, and credential access
- Treating sandbox output and submitted code as untrusted, with authentication and authorization around tool access
- Preferably removing unnecessary code-execution tools when a non-executable alternative is available
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for Ruby APIs that create processes, shells, or pseudo-terminals
- Code review checks for denylist-based sandboxing and incomplete API coverage
- Dependency and call-graph analysis to identify indirect execution entry points
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, shell launches, or pseudo-terminal creation by the server
- Policy enforcement that restricts tool invocation to authorized principals and rejects dynamic execution features
- Automated security review tools that flag command execution reachable from user-controlled input

