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CVE-2026-81094

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in mcp-router CLI

CVE-2026-81094

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthenticated access to MCP services and potential downstream compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The mcp-router CLI exposed its MCP aggregator on every network interface by default while requiring authentication only when an operator explicitly enabled it. As a result, any party able to reach the listening port could access the aggregator and the MCP servers it fronted without authentication.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs when the mcp-router serve command is started with its default settings or with a non-loopback host without a required authentication token. In these conditions, the aggregator may listen beyond the local machine, allowing reachable clients to interact with fronted MCP servers without first proving their identity.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible mcp-router aggregator listening endpoint
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the configured listening port; no valid credentials are required
  • Trigger point: Starting the serve command with default or externally reachable host settings
  • Why exploitation is possible: The service binds broadly and permits unauthenticated operation unless an operator explicitly supplies a token

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an insecure authentication and network-exposure default. The service listened on an all-interfaces address while treating authentication as optional, rather than requiring protection whenever the endpoint could be reached by other hosts. This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because access to the aggregator and its downstream operations was not consistently gated by an authentication mechanism.

Potential impact

  • Unauthenticated users may interact with exposed MCP servers
  • Attackers could invoke permitted tools or operations through the aggregator
  • Sensitive data may be disclosed or modified
  • Downstream systems reachable by MCP integrations could be affected
  • The exposed service could become an entry point for broader network compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing network exposure and making authentication mandatory for every non-local service endpoint.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Bind services to the loopback address by default
  • Require strong authentication whenever a service listens on a non-loopback address
  • Treat authentication as mandatory rather than opt-in for externally reachable interfaces
  • Place the aggregator behind an authenticated gateway or private network boundary
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to MCP servers and downstream integrations
  • Restrict inbound traffic with host, container, or network-level policy controls
  • Avoid exposing administrative or tool-invocation endpoints directly to untrusted networks

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and configuration checks for listeners bound to wildcard or all-interface addresses
  • Code review searches for optional authentication flags on network-facing commands
  • Tests that verify unauthenticated requests are rejected on every non-loopback binding
  • Runtime inventory of listening ports and exposed MCP aggregator endpoints
  • Policy enforcement requiring authentication and network restrictions for service endpoints
  • Automated security review tools that flag broad bindings combined with missing access control

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mcp-router/mcp-router
github.comgithub.com/mcp-router/mcp-router/blob/v0.6.3/apps/cli/src/commands/serve.ts#L105
github.comgithub.com/mcp-router/mcp-router/commit/4c4642cfd274097ec8b33ecd3047390829c79d35
github.comgithub.com/mcp-router/mcp-router/security/advisories/GHSA-rx55-5c7h-r56r
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/mcp-router-cli-before-0.6.3-binds-the-mcp-aggregator-to-all-interfaces-without-requiring-authentication

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the aggregator is reachable over a network and no authentication token is required. An attacker still needs network-level access to the listening port.

No local account is inherently required. Any client permitted to reach the exposed endpoint may be able to interact with it without valid credentials.

Keep the service bound to loopback unless external access is necessary, and require authentication whenever the listener uses a non-loopback address.

Test secure defaults, enforce authentication through policy and configuration validation, monitor exposed listeners, and apply least-privilege controls to the aggregator and its connected MCP servers.

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