Summary
OneUptime's webhook target validation can fail to recognize IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, such as an address representing a loopback or private IPv4 destination. An authenticated project member who can configure a webhook may use this gap to make the server request internal services, including cloud metadata or loopback endpoints, with responses potentially exposed through webhook results.
Affected context
The issue occurs in OneUptime deployments where authenticated project members can create or modify webhook targets. It becomes risky when webhook validation screens IPv4 and selected IPv6 forms but does not normalize or separately evaluate IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals before the HTTP client connects to the destination.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Server-side webhook delivery
- Required access: Authenticated project-member access with permission to configure a webhook
- Trigger point: Webhook target validation and subsequent HTTP request delivery
- Why exploitation is possible: An IPv4-mapped IPv6 literal may bypass hostname-literal checks while still being interpreted by the HTTP client as the embedded IPv4 destination
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from incomplete IP address classification in SSRF defenses. The validation logic checks selected private, loopback, link-local, unique-local, and unspecified address forms, but does not account for IPv4-mapped IPv6 representations that encode those same IPv4 destinations.
Because the mapped value is treated as an address literal rather than a hostname, a later resolution-based safety check may not be reached. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where attacker-influenced server requests can reach unintended internal resources.
Potential impact
- Access to loopback services that are not externally reachable
- Requests to private network resources
- Retrieval of link-local cloud metadata or other internal information
- Exposure of webhook responses to an authorized project member
- Possible credential disclosure, internal reconnaissance, or follow-on compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on canonicalizing and validating every supported IP representation before making an outbound request.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Normalize IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals into a consistent representation
- Reject private, loopback, link-local, unspecified, multicast, and other restricted destinations after normalization
- Apply the same destination policy to literal addresses and DNS-resolved addresses
- Re-check the final connection destination to reduce DNS rebinding and redirect-based bypasses
- Restrict webhook egress using network policies, firewalls, or dedicated outbound proxies
- Limit webhook configuration and response visibility according to least privilege
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for SSRF exposure through:
- Static analysis rules covering outbound HTTP requests that use user-controlled URLs
- Code review checks for incomplete IP-range validation and missing IPv4-mapped IPv6 handling
- Tests covering alternate textual representations of loopback, private, link-local, and metadata destinations
- Runtime monitoring for webhook requests to RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, and cloud metadata ranges
- Egress policies that alert on or block connections to restricted address spaces
Automated security review tools may help identify untrusted URL flows, although address canonicalization and network-policy behavior should also be tested explicitly.

