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CVE-2026-80208

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Missing Authentication (CWE-306) in APITable Accounts

CVE-2026-80208

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Unauthorized Account Destruction and Privacy Loss

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

APITable exposes internal account-history and account-closure endpoints without requiring a session or API key. An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the product gateway may enumerate accounts in the deletion cooling-off period and permanently close them, preventing recovery.

Affected context

The issue occurs in APITable deployments where the internal user controller is reachable through the product's API gateway and the affected endpoints are configured to bypass authentication. The risk is present when an external or otherwise unauthorized client can reach the gateway and the backend accepts requests to enumerate cooling-off accounts or initiate account closure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: API endpoints exposed through the APITable gateway
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the gateway; no valid session or API key is required
  • Trigger point: Requests to the internal user-history and account-closure endpoints
  • Why exploitation is possible: Endpoint annotations mark the operations as not requiring login, and the request interceptor returns before validating authentication credentials

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a missing authentication check on sensitive administrative operations. Security metadata marks internal controller methods as publicly accessible, while the request interceptor trusts that metadata and skips session and API-key validation. This maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, because destructive account-management actions can be invoked without establishing the caller's identity or authorization.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may enumerate users in the deletion cooling-off period
  • Accounts could be irreversibly closed without user consent
  • Users may lose email addresses, phone numbers, nicknames, and OAuth bindings
  • Space memberships and subscriptions could be removed
  • Legitimate account recovery during the cooling-off period could be prevented
  • The exposed account information could support targeted abuse or privacy violations

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that every sensitive internal operation is protected by authentication and authorization independently of endpoint annotations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require authenticated identity verification for account-history and closure operations
  • Apply explicit authorization checks based on account ownership or narrowly scoped administrative roles
  • Fail closed when authentication metadata is missing, inconsistent, or ambiguous
  • Keep internal APIs on a separate trusted interface rather than exposing them through general API routing
  • Limit gateway exposure and apply deny-by-default routing and access policies
  • Require deliberate confirmation and auditable authorization for irreversible account actions
  • Run account-management services with the minimum privileges needed to perform their functions

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and policy checks for sensitive controller methods marked as publicly accessible
  • Code review searches for authentication-bypass annotations on account, administration, or destructive operations
  • Integration tests that invoke critical endpoints without credentials and verify that access is denied
  • API inventory reviews comparing exposed routes with required authentication and authorization policies
  • Gateway configuration checks that identify internal paths proxied to broadly reachable backend services
  • Monitoring for repeated unauthenticated requests to user-history or account-closure endpoints

Automated security review tools can help identify missing authentication controls, but endpoint-specific authorization tests remain important.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apitable/apitable
github.comgithub.com/apitable/apitable/blob/88b24ce9f359cc434778be75d03603182882dc76/backend-server/application/src/main/java/com/apitable/internal/controller/InternalUserController.java#L149
github.comgithub.com/apitable/apitable/issues/1812
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/apitable-through-1.13.0-beta.1-missing-authentication-on-the-internal-account-closure-endpoints

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any client that can reach the relevant API routes through the product gateway may be able to invoke the affected operations without authentication.

No valid session or API key is required when the affected endpoints bypass the normal authentication checks. Network access to the gateway is the key prerequisite.

Require authentication and authorization for every account-history and account-closure request, and ensure those checks cannot be bypassed through endpoint annotations or routing behavior.

Use deny-by-default API policies, review authentication metadata on sensitive methods, keep internal routes isolated, and include unauthenticated negative tests for all destructive operations.

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