Summary
Kimai contains an authorization flaw in the QuickEntry controller that fails to verify the permission required to create timesheets for other users. An authenticated user who has permissions to view and edit other users' timesheets may create records for team members without the intended create authorization.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Kimai deployments using the QuickEntry timesheet creation workflow before version 2.62.0. It becomes risky when an authenticated account has view_other_timesheet and edit_other_timesheet permissions but does not have the separate create_other_timesheet permission, and the QuickEntry controller accepts the submitted form without enforcing that distinction.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated web application access through the QuickEntry controller
- Required access: An account with
view_other_timesheetandedit_other_timesheetpermissions - Trigger point: Submission of the QuickEntry form to create a timesheet for another team member
- Why exploitation is possible: The controller does not consistently validate
create_other_timesheetbefore creating the record
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization enforcement gap. The QuickEntry controller relies on related permissions for viewing and editing other users' timesheets but omits the distinct permission governing creation. This maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because the application performs a protected state-changing operation without checking the complete authorization policy at the point where the operation is executed.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may create timesheet records for other team members
- Unauthorized records could affect time tracking, reporting, billing, or payroll workflows
- Organizational audit trails may contain entries created outside the intended permission scope
- Incorrect or malicious timesheet data could require administrative remediation
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization consistently at every
state-changing endpoint, including alternate or convenience workflows such as
QuickEntry.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Check the specific create permission before accepting a timesheet for another user
- Apply server-side authorization independently of UI visibility or client-submitted values
- Centralize policy decisions so equivalent creation paths use the same authorization rules
- Default to denying cross-user record creation when the required permission is absent
- Apply least privilege to roles and regularly review permissions related to other users' records
- Log denied and successful cross-user creation attempts for accountability
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for state-changing controller actions that lack explicit authorization calls
- Review of permission matrices against every create, update, and delete route, including alternate form handlers
- Tests that distinguish view, edit, and create permissions for both self-owned and other-user records
- Policy enforcement requiring server-side authorization before persistence operations
- Audit-log analysis for timesheets created by users whose roles lack the corresponding creation permission
- Neutral automated review tools that flag controllers using related permissions without validating the operation-specific permission

