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CVE-2026-80119

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Physical Memory Disclosure (CWE-497) in DirectIo64.sys

CVE-2026-80119

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-73, CWE-497

Impact:

Sensitive Information Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A vulnerability in the DirectIo64.sys kernel driver used by several PassMark products can expose the complete contents of physical memory to an unauthenticated local attacker. If the attacker can access the driver's exposed IOCTL interface, the driver may write a full RAM image to a caller-controlled path, potentially revealing credentials, process data, and cryptographic material.

Affected context

The issue occurs in PassMark PerformanceTest, BurnInTest, and OSForensics deployments that install the affected DirectIo64.sys driver and expose its relevant device-control interface to local users. Risk is present when an untrusted local account can communicate with the driver and the driver performs physical-memory access and file output with SYSTEM privileges.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A locally accessible kernel-driver IOCTL interface
  • Required access: An unauthenticated local account able to open the exposed device interface
  • Trigger point: A driver request that initiates physical-memory enumeration, mapping, and output
  • Why exploitation is possible: The driver trusts caller-controlled output information and performs privileged memory and file operations without sufficiently restricting access to the requested data

Why this happens

The underlying flaw combines insufficient access control over a privileged driver operation with acceptance of caller-controlled file-path information. The driver accesses physical memory through kernel APIs and writes the resulting contents under SYSTEM context, allowing a low-privileged local caller to obtain data that should not be exposed through a user-accessible interface. This maps primarily to CWE-497: Exposure of Sensitive System Information, with CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path describing the unsafe path-handling behavior.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain credentials and authentication material held in process memory.
  • Sensitive application data, including LSASS working-set contents, could be exposed.
  • Cryptographic keys, tokens, and other secrets may be recovered from RAM.
  • The complete physical-memory image could support follow-on privilege escalation or lateral movement.
  • Privacy, confidentiality, and incident-response investigations could be significantly affected.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing access to privileged driver interfaces and preventing kernel components from exporting unrestricted physical memory.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting device-object and IOCTL access to narrowly defined, trusted principals.
  • Removing or disabling unnecessary hardware-access drivers and features.
  • Validating and constraining caller-supplied paths, preferably avoiding caller-selected output locations.
  • Enforcing explicit authorization before sensitive memory operations and returning only the minimum required data.
  • Running supporting applications with least privilege and applying strong endpoint application-control policies.
  • Protecting sensitive processes and secrets with platform security controls that reduce exposure from memory-access tooling.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Installation, loading, or unexpected use of DirectIo64.sys and associated PassMark applications.
  • User-mode processes opening the driver device and issuing unusual IOCTL requests.
  • Large sequential writes to newly created files from a SYSTEM-owned driver or service.
  • Static-analysis findings involving unrestricted physical-memory access, privileged file writes, and caller-controlled path values.
  • Code-review signals such as missing device ACLs, absent authorization checks, and kernel APIs used without strict policy enforcement.

Endpoint monitoring and automated code-review tools can help correlate driver activity with unexpected memory-dump files and local account behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
dkom.devdkom.dev/posts/directio64-disclosure/
github.comgithub.com/floppywiggler/directio64-disclosure
osforensics.comosforensics.com/whats-new.html
passmark.compassmark.com/products/burnintest/history.php
passmark.compassmark.com/products/performancetest/history.php
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/passmark-performancetest-burnintest-and-osforensics-physical-memory-disclosure-via-directio64-sys-ioctl

Frequently asked

questions

No direct remote access is described. Exploitation requires local access to the affected driver interface, although a separate remote compromise could potentially provide that access.

Not necessarily. The issue is described as unauthenticated local and depends primarily on whether the local account can reach the exposed device interface.

Restrict or remove unnecessary access to the driver, prevent unrestricted physical-memory export, and require strong authorization for sensitive IOCTL operations.

Apply least-privilege device ACLs, avoid exposing physical memory through general-purpose interfaces, validate all caller-controlled paths, and monitor privileged drivers for anomalous memory and file activity.

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