Summary
Airbyte Platform contains an authorization flaw in which the workspace used for permission checks can be selected from caller-controlled request data rather than derived from the requested resource. A member of one workspace may therefore access configuration or perform actions on connections, sources, and destinations owned by another workspace when the relevant endpoint accepts a resource identifier.
Affected context
The issue occurs in request authorization flows that resolve a workspace from
X-Airbyte-* headers populated from raw JSON request bodies. When an endpoint
supplies a resource identifier such as a connection, source, or destination
ID, the authorization process may prioritize a caller-supplied workspaceId
instead of deriving the workspace from that resource. The risk is present
where the resource's owning workspace is not subsequently compared with the
workspace used for authorization.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated Airbyte Platform API endpoints handling workspace resources
- Required access: Membership in at least one workspace, with privileges sufficient for the attempted operation in that workspace
- Trigger point: A request containing a resource identifier and a caller-controlled workspace identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization uses the nominated workspace while the operation acts on the separately supplied resource, without enforcing ownership consistency
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization-context mismatch. The application
copies recognized identifiers from an untrusted request body into headers,
and the workspace resolver gives the caller-supplied workspace identifier
precedence over identifiers associated with the target resource. Because the
resource's actual owning workspace is not used as the authoritative security
boundary, a valid permission decision for one workspace can be incorrectly
applied to an object in another. This behavior maps to CWE-639, Authorization
Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read source and destination configuration belonging to another workspace
- An attacker could trigger or cancel synchronization jobs outside their authorized workspace
- An attacker may delete connections, sources, or destinations they do not own
- Cross-workspace data exposure or operational disruption could result
- The vulnerability can weaken tenant isolation across shared Airbyte deployments
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making resource ownership authoritative in
every authorization decision.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the workspace from the server-side resource record rather than trusting caller-supplied workspace fields
- Enforcing an explicit equality check between the authorized workspace and the resource's owning workspace
- Treating identifiers copied from request bodies or headers as untrusted routing data
- Applying object-level authorization consistently to read, execute, update, and delete operations
- Designing APIs so redundant security-context fields cannot override resource-derived context
- Limiting service and workspace privileges according to least-privilege principles
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis rules identifying authorization decisions based on user-controlled workspace, tenant, or account identifiers
- Code review checks for endpoints that accept both a resource identifier and an independent authorization-context identifier
- Tests that attempt cross-tenant access using valid credentials from a different tenant
- Policy enforcement requiring every object-level operation to resolve and verify resource ownership server-side
- Runtime monitoring for authenticated users accessing resources outside their established workspace scope
Automated security review tools may help identify missing ownership checks and inconsistent authorization paths.

