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CVE-2026-79912

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

OS Command Injection (CWE-77) in TOTOLINK N600R Router

CVE-2026-79912

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the TOTOLINK N600R router affects the handling of the ntp_server argument by the getCurrentTime function. A remote attacker may be able to influence this input and cause operating-system commands to execute through the router's web interface.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the router's CGI request-processing logic when the getCurrentTime function handles the ntp_server parameter. It is potentially exposed when the affected management interface or endpoint is reachable by an attacker and input is incorporated into a system command without sufficient separation or validation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The router's CGI-based web management interface - Required access: Network reachability to the affected endpoint; additional

authentication requirements may depend on deployment configuration

  • Trigger point: Processing of the ntp_server argument by getCurrentTime - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input can reach command

execution logic without adequate command separation or neutralization

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an OS command construction flaw. Input supplied through the ntp_server parameter is incorporated into a command or command-like operation without reliably treating it as data. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-77, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with CWE-74 covering the broader class of injection vulnerabilities.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute operating-system commands with the privileges of the affected service.
  • The router could be compromised or its configuration altered.
  • Network traffic, credentials, or other locally accessible information could be exposed.
  • The device could be used for persistence, disruption, or further attacks against connected systems.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on ensuring that network-provided values are never concatenated into shell commands. Secure-by-default designs use structured APIs for time synchronization and pass arguments separately without invoking a shell. Input trust should be reduced through strict allowlisting, type and format validation, and rejection of unexpected characters, while validation should occur before any command-related processing. Management interfaces should be restricted to trusted networks, and device services should run with the minimum privileges necessary.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches include static analysis for string concatenation or interpolation involving request parameters and shell execution APIs, plus code review of CGI handlers that pass user input to system utilities. Runtime monitoring can look for unexpected child processes, shell invocations, or command activity originating from the router's web service. Network and configuration policies can also restrict management exposure and alert on anomalous administrative requests. Automated security review tools may help identify command construction patterns during development.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dxz0069/WAVLINK-WN530H4-Command-Injection-in-set_add_routing/blob/main/TOTOLINK_N600R_cstecgi_Time_WiFi_Service_popen_Command_Injection.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-79912
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/881261
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/395062
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/395062/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The affected CGI functionality can be reached remotely when the relevant

management interface or endpoint is network-accessible. Authentication and

exposure depend on the device's configuration.

The attacker needs network access to the affected request-processing endpoint.

Whether valid credentials are also required depends on how the router's

management interface is deployed and protected.

The safest pattern is to remove shell-based command construction, use a

structured API, and pass validated values as separate arguments when an

operating-system utility is unavoidable.

Apply strict allowlist validation, minimize management-interface exposure,

use least-privilege service accounts, and review all paths from request

parameters to process or shell execution.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.