Summary
Alluxio's S3 REST proxy does not verify AWS Signature Version 4 signatures in its default configuration, allowing unauthenticated requests to spoof user identities. An attacker may impersonate ordinary users or service accounts and read, write, or delete data available to those identities.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Alluxio deployments that expose the S3 REST proxy while relying on its default authentication configuration. When AWS Signature Version 4 verification is not enforced, identity information from an unsigned Authorization header may be trusted as though the request had been authenticated, potentially extending the issue to users and service accounts with access to sensitive data.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The Alluxio S3 REST proxy endpoint - Required access: Network reachability to the proxy; valid credentials are
not necessarily required
- Trigger point: Processing an S3 request containing an unsigned or
improperly verified Authorization header
- Why exploitation is possible: The proxy may derive the requested identity
from attacker-controlled header data without cryptographically validating
the AWS Signature Version 4 request
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authentication trust failure: identity claims in an Authorization header are accepted without requiring successful AWS Signature Version 4 verification. This maps to CWE-287, Improper Authentication, because the service does not reliably establish that a request was created by the principal it identifies before authorizing data operations.
Potential impact
- An unauthenticated attacker may impersonate arbitrary users
- Attackers could access data permitted to the spoofed identity
- Data may be created, modified, or deleted without authorization
- Service-account impersonation could broaden access to sensitive datasets
- Confidentiality, integrity, and availability of stored data could be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making cryptographic request authentication mandatory rather than optional in the S3 proxy. Signature verification should occur before identity extraction or authorization, and unsigned or malformed requests should be rejected by default. Deployments can also reduce exposure by placing the proxy behind authenticated network boundaries, limiting service-account privileges, separating data-access roles, and applying least-privilege policies to S3 operations. Configuration and policy changes should be protected from unauthorized modification.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches include static and configuration analysis for disabled or optional AWS Signature Version 4 verification, code review checks that compare identity extraction with signature-validation results, and policy enforcement requiring authenticated S3 requests. Runtime monitoring can alert on unsigned Authorization headers, repeated identity mismatches, unexpected service-account activity, and data operations from unfamiliar sources. Automated security scanners and API gateway policies may help identify authentication enforcement gaps.

