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CVE-2026-79748

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in MCPHub Server API

CVE-2026-79748

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Privilege Abuse

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.9)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

MCPHub exposes authenticated server-management endpoints that can create or update configurations and immediately launch the specified operating-system process. Because these endpoints do not restrict access to administrators and do not constrain command or argument values, an authenticated non-admin user may achieve remote code execution with the MCPHub service account's privileges.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in MCPHub deployments where the server-creation or server-update APIs are reachable by authenticated users. The risk is greatest when a non-admin account can submit arbitrary command and argument values, and when MCPHub runs with elevated operating-system privileges, such as root in some container or service configurations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Authenticated HTTP access to the server-management API
  • Required access: Any valid user account with access to the affected endpoints; administrator privileges are not required
  • Trigger point: Creation or update of an MCP server configuration
  • Why exploitation is possible: The submitted command and arguments are passed to process-spawning functionality without sufficient authorization, allowlisting, or sanitization

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is missing authorization on privileged management operations, mapping to CWE-862: Missing Authorization. MCPHub authenticates requests but does not verify that the caller has administrative permission before allowing process-launching configuration changes. The impact is amplified by accepting attacker-controlled executable and argument fields and passing them to the operating-system process launcher.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands as the MCPHub service account.
  • The attacker could access, modify, or destroy data available to that account.
  • A deployment running with elevated privileges may allow broader host or container compromise.
  • The attacker may alter MCP routing or server configurations to support persistence, interception, or service disruption.
  • Inadequately isolated environments could enable lateral movement into connected systems.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization for every privileged configuration operation and reducing the trust placed in process-launch parameters.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting server creation, update, and process-launching operations to explicitly authorized administrators.
  • Applying deny-by-default authorization checks on both route and object-level operations.
  • Replacing arbitrary command and argument fields with a tightly controlled server registry or allowlist.
  • Validating configuration values against strict schemas and rejecting unexpected executable paths or arguments.
  • Running MCPHub with a dedicated, non-root service account and minimal filesystem, network, and operating-system permissions.
  • Isolating launched processes and limiting their access to secrets, host resources, and sensitive control-plane interfaces.
  • Separating configuration management from process execution where practical and requiring review for executable changes.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar weaknesses through:

  • Static analysis and route reviews that flag privileged endpoints lacking explicit role or capability checks.
  • Code searches for process-spawning APIs receiving values from request bodies or persisted configuration.
  • Review of authorization middleware coverage for create, update, and delete operations on server-management resources.
  • Policy checks requiring executable paths to come from approved registries rather than user-controlled fields.
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual child processes, unexpected command-line arguments, or process launches by the MCPHub service account.
  • Audit logging that records the authenticated principal, authorization decision, configuration change, and spawned process metadata.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/samanhappy/mcphub/pull/770
github.comgithub.com/samanhappy/mcphub/releases/tag/v0.12.15
github.comgithub.com/samanhappy/mcphub/security/advisories/GHSA-mx89-jjx9-gjr8

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable through the MCPHub API when an attacker has authenticated access to the affected server-management endpoints. Network reachability and account privileges determine the practical exposure.

No. The central issue is that authenticated non-admin users may reach operations that should be restricted to administrators.

Enforce explicit administrator authorization before configuration changes can trigger process creation, and permit execution only from a tightly controlled registry of approved commands and arguments.

Apply deny-by-default authorization, treat process-launch parameters as high-risk inputs, run services with least privilege, and monitor configuration changes and child-process activity.

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