Summary
CRMEB v6.0.0 contains an arbitrary file deletion vulnerability in the /adminapi/file/video_data_save component. An authenticated attacker who can submit crafted POST requests may delete files outside the intended application-managed location.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in CRMEB deployments that expose the /adminapi/file/video_data_save endpoint and permit authenticated users to reach it. Risk is increased when server-side file paths are derived from request data without sufficiently restricting them to an approved storage directory.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The CRMEB administrative API endpoint
/adminapi/file/video_data_save - Required access: Valid authentication or an account authorized to access the endpoint
- Trigger point: Processing of a crafted POST request containing file-related input
- Why exploitation is possible: Request-controlled path information may be used for deletion without adequate canonicalization and directory boundary enforcement
Why this happens
The underlying issue is improper handling of externally influenced file paths, mapping to CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path. The application appears to trust path-related input when selecting a file for deletion, rather than constraining it to an intended storage location and verifying that the resolved path remains within that boundary.
Potential impact
- An attacker may delete application files or stored content
- The application could experience denial of service or functionality loss
- Configuration, logs, or user-uploaded data may be removed
- Data integrity and recovery operations may be affected
- Deletion of security-relevant files could weaken monitoring or controls
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing trust in client-supplied file paths and enforcing narrow file-management boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Accepting opaque server-generated file identifiers instead of raw paths
- Canonicalizing and validating paths against an approved storage directory
- Rejecting path traversal sequences, absolute paths, symbolic-link escapes, and unexpected path formats
- Restricting deletion operations to files created and tracked by the application
- Applying least privilege to the service account and storage filesystem
- Requiring explicit authorization for destructive file operations
- Using soft deletion, backups, and audit logging where operationally appropriate
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules that identify filesystem deletion APIs receiving request-derived values
- Code review checks for missing canonicalization and storage-boundary validation
- Tests using traversal-like, absolute, symbolic-link, and malformed path inputs
- API policies that restrict destructive operations by role and resource ownership
- Runtime monitoring for unusual deletion volume, targets outside managed directories, or repeated failed path-validation events
Automated security review tools may help identify data flows from HTTP parameters to filesystem operations.

