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CVE-2026-79396

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Hardcoded Credentials (CWE-798) in Xiongmai IP Camera

CVE-2026-79396

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hardcoded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Unauthorized Administrative Access

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Xiongmai IP Camera XM530 firmware contains static administrative credentials in plaintext configuration data and in the Sofia executable. A remote attacker who can reach the camera's exposed management services may use these credentials to obtain full administrative control.

Affected context

The issue affects Xiongmai IP Camera XM530 devices running HMT.CM2005-v220608.1837 or earlier, where default account credentials are embedded in bin/config.xml and compiled into the Sofia executable. Risk is greatest when camera management interfaces are reachable by untrusted networks and the embedded credentials remain active or reusable.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible camera management or authentication services
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the affected device; valid credentials may not otherwise be known to the attacker
  • Trigger point: Authentication to an exposed camera service using embedded account credentials
  • Why exploitation is possible: Static administrative credentials are stored in firmware artifacts and may be shared across devices or recoverable through firmware analysis

Why this happens

The firmware embeds reusable administrative credentials directly in plaintext configuration data and compiled application code. This is a CWE-798: Use of Hardcoded Credentials condition because authentication depends on a fixed secret that cannot be safely rotated through normal per-device credential management, allowing possession or discovery of the firmware data to undermine access controls.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain full administrative control of the camera
  • An attacker could view, alter, or disable camera feeds and settings
  • The device may be used to monitor protected environments or invade privacy
  • Compromised cameras could support lateral movement or participation in additional attacks
  • Attackers may be able to change network and account configuration

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared secrets from firmware and ensuring every device has unique, changeable credentials.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Replacing hardcoded administrative accounts with per-device secrets or secure enrollment
  • Requiring a forced credential change during initial setup
  • Storing credentials using protected mechanisms rather than plaintext firmware artifacts
  • Disabling unused management services and limiting administrative interfaces to trusted networks
  • Applying least-privilege roles so routine camera functions do not require full administration
  • Protecting firmware build and distribution pipelines from unauthorized modification
  • Segmenting cameras from sensitive systems and monitoring administrative access

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis and firmware review for credential-like strings in XML files, binaries, symbols, and embedded resources. Code review should flag shared default accounts, authentication paths that bypass device-specific enrollment, and secrets compiled into executables. Organizations can also enforce policies that prohibit plaintext credentials and require unique-device authentication, while network monitoring can identify unexpected administrative logins or management traffic from untrusted segments. Automated firmware scanning and secret-detection tools may help surface these patterns during build and release review.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ShiroiBoushi/vulnerability-research/tree/main/CVE-2026-79396

Frequently asked

questions

It may be, when the camera's authentication or management services are reachable by an attacker and the embedded credentials remain valid.

Not necessarily. The vulnerability concerns credentials embedded in the firmware, so network access to an affected service may be sufficient if those credentials can be used for authentication.

Remove shared hardcoded credentials, use unique device-level secrets or secure enrollment, and require administrators to establish changeable credentials during setup.

Scan firmware and source artifacts for secrets, prohibit default administrative accounts through release policy, isolate device management networks, and monitor authentication activity for anomalous access.

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