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CVE-2026-79323

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Information Disclosure (CWE-200) in Magefan Blog GraphQL

CVE-2026-79323

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Exposure of personal information and internal account identifiers

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A data exposure vulnerability in the blogComments GraphQL query of Magefan Blog GraphQL for Magento 2 can reveal commenter email addresses and internal customer or administrator identifiers. The issue becomes risky when the GraphQL endpoint is publicly reachable and permits unauthenticated queries.

Affected context

The vulnerability affects Magento 2 installations using Magefan Blog GraphQL with a publicly accessible /graphql endpoint. In affected configurations, the blogComments query may return commenter email addresses and internal customer or administrator identifiers without requiring an authenticated session.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The Magento GraphQL endpoint at /graphql
  • Required access: No authentication may be required when the endpoint and query are exposed
  • Trigger point: A POST request invoking the blogComments GraphQL query
  • Why exploitation is possible: The query can disclose sensitive commenter and account-related fields without sufficiently restricting access to the returned data

Why this happens

The underlying issue is insufficient access control and data exposure in a GraphQL resolver or field selection path. Sensitive email addresses and internal identifiers are returned to unauthenticated callers instead of being limited according to data sensitivity and requester privileges. This behavior maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may obtain blog commenter email addresses
  • Exposed addresses could support phishing, spam, or targeted social engineering
  • Internal customer and administrator identifiers could be used to improve account enumeration
  • Disclosed data may contribute to broader privacy or reconnaissance risks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing the data returned by public GraphQL operations and enforcing authorization at the resolver and field levels.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Returning only the minimum commenter information required by public blog features
  • Requiring authentication or appropriate authorization for sensitive fields
  • Applying field-level access controls consistently across GraphQL queries
  • Avoiding exposure of internal customer and administrator identifiers
  • Treating email addresses and account metadata as sensitive by default
  • Restricting public GraphQL access through policy, rate limits, and monitoring where appropriate
  • Separating public content schemas from privileged customer or administrative data

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:

  • Static and schema analysis for sensitive fields exposed by unauthenticated GraphQL operations
  • Code review of resolvers, authorization directives, and field-level permission checks
  • API tests that query public operations without credentials and inspect returned data
  • GraphQL schema inventory and policy enforcement to flag email, customer, and administrator identifiers
  • Runtime monitoring for repeated or broad blogComments queries and unusual access patterns
  • Automated security testing and neutral code-review tools that identify missing authorization or excessive data exposure

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/mrtantoine/4331a5f04f8309eb1799b257a7371f34
magefan.commagefan.com/magento2-blog-extension

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the Magento GraphQL endpoint is reachable remotely and the affected query permits unauthenticated access. No local access is generally needed.

The described issue can be triggered without a valid account by sending a POST request to the public /graphql endpoint, subject to deployment-specific routing and access controls.

Restrict sensitive fields at the GraphQL resolver and schema levels, require appropriate authorization, and return only the minimum data needed for public blog functionality.

Classify email addresses and internal identifiers as sensitive, test every public GraphQL operation without credentials, enforce field-level authorization, and monitor schema changes for newly exposed data.

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