Summary
Aidot smart-plug and smart-light-bulb products contain a code-injection vulnerability in UPnP root description parsing. A remote attacker who can reach the affected UPnP service may be able to provide crafted parsing input and execute code on the device.
Aidot smart-plug and smart-light-bulb products contain a code-injection vulnerability in UPnP root description parsing. A remote attacker who can reach the affected UPnP service may be able to provide crafted parsing input and execute code on the device.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects certain Aidot products when their UPnP functionality processes root description data without adequately separating descriptive content from executable behavior. Affected product families include Linkind Matter Smart Plug, OREiN Matter Smart Light Bulb, and Linkind Wi-Fi Smart Light Bulb; exploitability depends on network exposure and device-side parsing behavior.
The vulnerability affects certain Aidot products when their UPnP functionality processes root description data without adequately separating descriptive content from executable behavior. Affected product families include Linkind Matter Smart Plug, OREiN Matter Smart Light Bulb, and Linkind Wi-Fi Smart Light Bulb; exploitability depends on network exposure and device-side parsing behavior.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: UPnP root description parsing
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected device or UPnP service; authentication requirements may depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing a maliciously crafted UPnP root description
- Why exploitation is possible: Input handled by the parser can influence execution in a way that permits attacker-controlled code to run
- Attack surface: UPnP root description parsing
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected device or UPnP service; authentication requirements may depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing a maliciously crafted UPnP root description
- Why exploitation is possible: Input handled by the parser can influence execution in a way that permits attacker-controlled code to run
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an unsafe relationship between externally supplied UPnP description data and execution-sensitive processing. Rather than treating the root description strictly as untrusted metadata, the affected parsing path may interpret attacker-controlled content in a manner that enables code execution. This behavior maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').
The underlying issue is an unsafe relationship between externally supplied UPnP description data and execution-sensitive processing. Rather than treating the root description strictly as untrusted metadata, the affected parsing path may interpret attacker-controlled content in a manner that enables code execution. This behavior maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection').
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the affected device
- Device settings or operational behavior could be modified
- Network traffic or local data may be accessed or altered
- The device could be used for additional attacks against reachable systems
- Persistent compromise or disruption of smart-home services could occur
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code on the affected device
- Device settings or operational behavior could be modified
- Network traffic or local data may be accessed or altered
- The device could be used for additional attacks against reachable systems
- Persistent compromise or disruption of smart-home services could occur
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating all UPnP description data as untrusted and preventing parser input from reaching executable contexts.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using strict, non-executable parsers for UPnP metadata
- Applying allowlisted schemas and bounded values before processing
- Separating parsing, validation, and execution privileges
- Disabling unnecessary UPnP exposure or restricting it to trusted network segments
- Running device services with least privilege and minimizing available system capabilities
- Rejecting malformed, unexpected, or unsupported description elements by default
Mitigation generally focuses on treating all UPnP description data as untrusted and preventing parser input from reaching executable contexts.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using strict, non-executable parsers for UPnP metadata
- Applying allowlisted schemas and bounded values before processing
- Separating parsing, validation, and execution privileges
- Disabling unnecessary UPnP exposure or restricting it to trusted network segments
- Running device services with least privilege and minimizing available system capabilities
- Rejecting malformed, unexpected, or unsupported description elements by default
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying dynamic evaluation, command construction, or executable interpretation in UPnP parsers
- Code review checks for parser output flowing into shell, interpreter, or system API calls
- Fuzz testing of root description handling with malformed and unexpected metadata
- Network monitoring for unusual UPnP description requests and parsing failures
- Policy enforcement that limits UPnP exposure and requires input validation at protocol boundaries
- Automated security review tools that flag code-injection sinks and untrusted-data flows
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying dynamic evaluation, command construction, or executable interpretation in UPnP parsers
- Code review checks for parser output flowing into shell, interpreter, or system API calls
- Fuzz testing of root description handling with malformed and unexpected metadata
- Network monitoring for unusual UPnP description requests and parsing failures
- Policy enforcement that limits UPnP exposure and requires input validation at protocol boundaries
- Automated security review tools that flag code-injection sinks and untrusted-data flows
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| aidot. | aidot.com/ |
