Summary
A critical code injection vulnerability in iStoreOS allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code by supplying a malicious task_id to the task handling logic. The issue becomes risky when remotely controlled task identifiers are processed without strict validation or safe command construction.
A critical code injection vulnerability in iStoreOS allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code by supplying a malicious task_id to the task handling logic. The issue becomes risky when remotely controlled task identifiers are processed without strict validation or safe command construction.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects iStoreOS deployments using the affected tasks-lib.lua task-processing component. It may be present when task_id values can be influenced through a remotely reachable interface and are subsequently interpreted as code or embedded in an executable operation without adequate validation and separation from control syntax.
The vulnerability affects iStoreOS deployments using the affected tasks-lib.lua task-processing component. It may be present when task_id values can be influenced through a remotely reachable interface and are subsequently interpreted as code or embedded in an executable operation without adequate validation and separation from control syntax.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable iStoreOS task-management or task-processing interface
- Required access: The ability to submit or influence a task_id value; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the supplied task_id by
tasks-lib.lua - Why exploitation is possible: The task identifier is handled in a way that may allow attacker-controlled content to reach code-execution functionality
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable iStoreOS task-management or task-processing interface
- Required access: The ability to submit or influence a task_id value; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the supplied task_id by
tasks-lib.lua - Why exploitation is possible: The task identifier is handled in a way that may allow attacker-controlled content to reach code-execution functionality
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient separation between untrusted task identifiers and executable logic. When application-controlled values are incorporated into code evaluation, shell execution, or another interpreter without strict allowlisting and safe parameter handling, attacker input can alter the operation being performed. This behavior maps to CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code, commonly called code injection.
The underlying issue is insufficient separation between untrusted task identifiers and executable logic. When application-controlled values are incorporated into code evaluation, shell execution, or another interpreter without strict allowlisting and safe parameter handling, attacker input can alter the operation being performed. This behavior maps to CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code, commonly called code injection.
Potential impact
- An attacker could execute arbitrary code on the affected device
- System settings, credentials, or sensitive data could be accessed or modified
- Network services managed by the device could be disrupted
- The device could be used for lateral movement or broader network compromise
- Integrity of tasks and device operations could be undermined
- An attacker could execute arbitrary code on the affected device
- System settings, credentials, or sensitive data could be accessed or modified
- Network services managed by the device could be disrupted
- The device could be used for lateral movement or broader network compromise
- Integrity of tasks and device operations could be undermined
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing interpreter exposure from task
processing and treating task identifiers as data rather than executable
content.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing dynamic evaluation or command construction with fixed internal task mappings
- Enforcing strict allowlists and type, length, and format validation for task_id values
- Passing values through structured APIs with separated arguments rather than string-built commands
- Applying least privilege to the service handling remote task requests
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted networks and authenticated operators
- Using secure-by-default authorization and rejecting unexpected task identifiers
Mitigation generally focuses on removing interpreter exposure from task
processing and treating task identifiers as data rather than executable
content.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing dynamic evaluation or command construction with fixed internal task mappings
- Enforcing strict allowlists and type, length, and format validation for task_id values
- Passing values through structured APIs with separated arguments rather than string-built commands
- Applying least privilege to the service handling remote task requests
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted networks and authenticated operators
- Using secure-by-default authorization and rejecting unexpected task identifiers
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying dynamic evaluation, string-built commands, or interpreter calls involving request parameters
- Code review checks for task identifiers flowing from network handlers into execution APIs
- Runtime logging and alerting for unexpected task names, malformed identifiers, or unusual process creation
- Policy enforcement that requires allowlisted task definitions and structured argument passing
- Automated security review tools that trace untrusted input into code-execution sinks
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules identifying dynamic evaluation, string-built commands, or interpreter calls involving request parameters
- Code review checks for task identifiers flowing from network handlers into execution APIs
- Runtime logging and alerting for unexpected task names, malformed identifiers, or unusual process creation
- Policy enforcement that requires allowlisted task definitions and structured argument passing
- Automated security review tools that trace untrusted input into code-execution sinks
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| doc. | doc.linkease.com/ |
| fw. | fw.koolcenter.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| pastebin. | pastebin.com/ |
