Summary
A critical OS command injection vulnerability in the Netcore B11 Enterprise-level full Gigabit 9-port shop wireless router allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the www/cgi-bin/upgrade interface.
The risk is highest when the affected management endpoint is remotely reachable and does not adequately restrict or safely process supplied input.
A critical OS command injection vulnerability in the Netcore B11 Enterprise-level full Gigabit 9-port shop wireless router allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the www/cgi-bin/upgrade interface.
The risk is highest when the affected management endpoint is remotely reachable and does not adequately restrict or safely process supplied input.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in affected Netcore B11 router firmware versions, including v1.3.241114.024540 and earlier, through the www/cgi-bin/upgrade web endpoint. Exposure depends on whether the router's web management interface is reachable by an attacker and whether request data reaches operating-system command execution without adequate validation or separation.
The vulnerability occurs in affected Netcore B11 router firmware versions, including v1.3.241114.024540 and earlier, through the www/cgi-bin/upgrade web endpoint. Exposure depends on whether the router's web management interface is reachable by an attacker and whether request data reaches operating-system command execution without adequate validation or separation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The router's remotely reachable web management interface
- Required access: Network access to the affected
www/cgi-bin/upgradeendpoint; authentication requirements depend on the device's configuration and access controls - Trigger point: Processing of a request by the firmware upgrade functionality
- Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input may be interpreted as operating-system command content rather than treated solely as structured upgrade data
- Attack surface: The router's remotely reachable web management interface
- Required access: Network access to the affected
www/cgi-bin/upgradeendpoint; authentication requirements depend on the device's configuration and access controls - Trigger point: Processing of a request by the firmware upgrade functionality
- Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input may be interpreted as operating-system command content rather than treated solely as structured upgrade data
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an OS command injection condition mapped to CWE-78. The upgrade handler appears to pass insufficiently constrained input into a command-execution context, allowing data intended for firmware management to influence shell or operating-system operations. This insecure pattern combines inadequate input trust reduction with unsafe construction or invocation of system commands.
The underlying bug is an OS command injection condition mapped to CWE-78. The upgrade handler appears to pass insufficiently constrained input into a command-execution context, allowing data intended for firmware management to influence shell or operating-system operations. This insecure pattern combines inadequate input trust reduction with unsafe construction or invocation of system commands.
Potential impact
- An attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the affected router service
- The device could be modified, disabled, or used to alter network traffic
- Sensitive configuration data may be accessed or changed
- The router could be used as a foothold for attacks against connected systems
- Network availability and confidentiality could be compromised
- An attacker could execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the affected router service
- The device could be modified, disabled, or used to alter network traffic
- Sensitive configuration data may be accessed or changed
- The router could be used as a foothold for attacks against connected systems
- Network availability and confidentiality could be compromised
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing attacker influence from operating-system command construction and reducing the trust placed in management requests.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using dedicated APIs instead of shell execution for upgrade operations
- Applying strict allowlist validation to firmware metadata and file references
- Separating data from commands and avoiding shell interpretation
- Requiring authenticated, authorized management access with secure-by-default network exposure
- Running upgrade and web-management processes with the minimum required privileges
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted administration networks where feasible
- Treating uploaded or referenced firmware artifacts as untrusted until verified through integrity and authenticity checks
Mitigation generally focuses on removing attacker influence from operating-system command construction and reducing the trust placed in management requests.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Using dedicated APIs instead of shell execution for upgrade operations
- Applying strict allowlist validation to firmware metadata and file references
- Separating data from commands and avoiding shell interpretation
- Requiring authenticated, authorized management access with secure-by-default network exposure
- Running upgrade and web-management processes with the minimum required privileges
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted administration networks where feasible
- Treating uploaded or referenced firmware artifacts as untrusted until verified through integrity and authenticity checks
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis of web handlers for string concatenation or interpolation passed to shell and process-execution APIs
- Code review of firmware upgrade, diagnostic, and administrative endpoints
- Tests using boundary and malformed input to verify that command metacharacters cannot alter execution behavior
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, shell invocations, or outbound connections from router management services
- Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted command arguments and authenticated management paths
- Automated security review tools that flag command construction from request parameters
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis of web handlers for string concatenation or interpolation passed to shell and process-execution APIs
- Code review of firmware upgrade, diagnostic, and administrative endpoints
- Tests using boundary and malformed input to verify that command metacharacters cannot alter execution behavior
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, shell invocations, or outbound connections from router management services
- Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted command arguments and authenticated management paths
- Automated security review tools that flag command construction from request parameters
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| pastebin. | pastebin.com/ |
